There are two players called 1 and 2. Player 1 can be of two types t E {0,1} with Pr (t=1) = n E (0,1). [Here, a is a symbol] The actions and payoffs of the game are given by: left right 0,4|1,1 up down 1,2 t,4 where the row player is player 1. We will use the following notation: 01(t): probability that player 1 plays up if she is of type t; 02: probability that player 2 plays left.
There are two players called 1 and 2. Player 1 can be of two types t E {0,1} with Pr (t=1) = n E (0,1). [Here, a is a symbol] The actions and payoffs of the game are given by: left right 0,4|1,1 up down 1,2 t,4 where the row player is player 1. We will use the following notation: 01(t): probability that player 1 plays up if she is of type t; 02: probability that player 2 plays left.
A First Course in Probability (10th Edition)
10th Edition
ISBN:9780134753119
Author:Sheldon Ross
Publisher:Sheldon Ross
Chapter1: Combinatorial Analysis
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1.1P: a. How many different 7-place license plates are possible if the first 2 places are for letters and...
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If type-0 player 1 is mixing, what condition must be satisfied in this equilibrium?
![There are two players called 1 and 2. Player 1 can be of two types t E {0,1} with Pr (t=1) = T.
E (0,1). [Here, a is a symbol]
The actions and payoffs of the game are given by:
|left right
up
0,4 1,1
down 1,2 t,4
where the row player is player 1.
We will use the following notation:
01(t): probability that player 1 plays up if she is of type t;
02: probability that player 2 plays left.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fb678b996-d262-4813-b865-a5e25cd82b90%2F5f3826a3-a3e1-4dfd-945e-adb45a86d3ed%2F0qhaorn_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:There are two players called 1 and 2. Player 1 can be of two types t E {0,1} with Pr (t=1) = T.
E (0,1). [Here, a is a symbol]
The actions and payoffs of the game are given by:
|left right
up
0,4 1,1
down 1,2 t,4
where the row player is player 1.
We will use the following notation:
01(t): probability that player 1 plays up if she is of type t;
02: probability that player 2 plays left.
Transcribed Image Text:We want to know whether and when it is possible that in a Bayes Nash equilibrium player 1
mixes between up and down whenever she is of type t = 0, i.e. 01(0) E (0,1).
We therefore proceed to construct such an equilibrium and then verify for which values of t
this equilibrium exists.
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We can immediately conclude that in this equilibrium type-1 player 1 must play...? State your answer as a value for σ1(1).
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