need help on question 4-13 Page <2>of 6ZOOM+[7]this is represented as a dynamic game.Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly,А.TrueВ.False[8]Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Accordingly,A moves first while B moves second.А.TrueВ.False[9]backwards induction, B will produce a quantity closest in value to:Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by usingА.В.7С.9D.15[10]backwards induction, the market quantity is closest in value to:Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by usingА.12В.15С.18D.21[11]backwards induction, the market price is closest in value to:Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by usingА.15В.10C.D.Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by using[12]backwards induction, A’s profit is closest in value to:А.68В.52С.44D.32[13]backwards induction, B’s profit is closest in value to:Suppose A becomes a Stackelberg leader, while B becomes a Stackelberg follower. Solving by usingА.8В.16С.2026 Use the following to answer questions (1) - (14): Suppose the local market for flat glass, considered ahomogeneous product, consists of two firms, A and B. The market demand is given as:Q = 40 - 2P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the price.A's total cost (TC) is: TC, = 6°q4, where q, is the quantity produced and sold by AB's total cost (TC3) is: TC, = 8q2, where qg is the quantity produced and sold by B[1]The market structure these two firms operate in is definitely not monopolistic competition.A.TrueВ.False[2]Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A produces a quantity closest in value to:A.9В.11C.13D.15[3]Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market quantity is closest in value to:A.10В.13С.17D.20[4]Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market price is closest in value to:A.9В.11C.15D.19[5]Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium B's profit is closest in value to:A.8.В.16C.20D.26[6]Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A's profit is closest in value to:A.8.В.16C.20D.26

Since we only answer up to 3 sub-parts, we’ll answer the first 3. Please resubmit the question and…

Use the following to answer questions (1) - (14): Suppose the local market for flat glass, considered a homogeneous product, consists of two firms, A and B. The market demand is given as: Q = 40 - 2P, where Q is the market quantity and P is the price. A's total cost (TC,) is: TC, = 6°94, where q, is the quantity produced and sold by A B's total cost (TC,) is: TC, = 8qg, where qų is the quantity produced and sold by B [1] The market structure these two firms operate in is definitely not monopolistic competition. А. True В. False [2] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A produces a quantity closest in value to: A. 9 В. С. D. 11 13 15 [3] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market quantity is closest in value to: А. 10 В. 13 С. 17 D. 20 [4] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium the market price is closest in value to: А. В. 11 С. 15 D. 19 [5] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium B's profit is closest in value to: А. 8. В. 16 С. D. 20 26 [6] Behaving as Cournot competitors, at the Nash equilibrium A's profit is closest in value to: A. 8. В. С. D. 16 20 26