Two roommates, Eric and Noah, decide independently of each other how much time to spend cleaning the common area of the aparment they share. Specifically, Eric chooses he 20 (hours per week), while Noah chooses hy 20. They both enjoy living in a clean space, and both pay a cost for cleaning (as it leaves them less time to do other things). Their utility when the apartment has been cleaned for h hours (where h = he + hy is the total number of hours the two roommates spend cleaning) is 20h, while their hourly cost is a variable c > 1. To summarize, their payoff functions are: Ju₁(he,hN) = 20√he+hN- che |u₂(he, hn) = 20√he+hN-chN. (a) Compute the (pure-strategy) symmetric Nash equilibrium (how many hours will each roommate spend cleaning?). (b) Suppose Eric and Noah are getting busy with exams coming up. This increases their cost of cleaning, from c to d > c. What impact does this have on the equilibrium number of hours they spend cleaning? Is the Nash equilibrium computed in (a) Pareto efficient? Explain. (b)
Two roommates, Eric and Noah, decide independently of each other how much time to spend cleaning the common area of the aparment they share. Specifically, Eric chooses he 20 (hours per week), while Noah chooses hy 20. They both enjoy living in a clean space, and both pay a cost for cleaning (as it leaves them less time to do other things). Their utility when the apartment has been cleaned for h hours (where h = he + hy is the total number of hours the two roommates spend cleaning) is 20h, while their hourly cost is a variable c > 1. To summarize, their payoff functions are: Ju₁(he,hN) = 20√he+hN- che |u₂(he, hn) = 20√he+hN-chN. (a) Compute the (pure-strategy) symmetric Nash equilibrium (how many hours will each roommate spend cleaning?). (b) Suppose Eric and Noah are getting busy with exams coming up. This increases their cost of cleaning, from c to d > c. What impact does this have on the equilibrium number of hours they spend cleaning? Is the Nash equilibrium computed in (a) Pareto efficient? Explain. (b)
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
Please try to solve it complete in 1 hour thanks
![Two roommates, Eric and Noah, decide independently of each other how much
time to spend cleaning the common area of the aparment they share. Specifically, Eric chooses
he 20 (hours per week), while Noah chooses hN 2 0. They both enjoy living in a clean space,
and both pay a cost for cleaning (as it leaves them less time to do other things). Their utility
when the apartment has been cleaned for h hours (where h = hg + hy is the total number of
hours the two roommates spend cleaning) is 20vh, while their hourly cost is a variable c>1.
To summarize, their payoff functions are:
u1 (he, hN) = 20Vhg +hN- chE
lu2(he,hN) = 20 hg + hy – chn.
%3D
(a)
will each roommate spend cleaning?).
Compute the (pure-strategy) symmetric Nash equilibrium (how many hours
Suppose Eric and Noah are getting busy with exams coming up. This increases
(Б)
their cost of cleaning, from c to d > c. What impact does this have on the equilibrium
number of hours they spend cleaning?
(b)
Is the Nash equilibrium computed in (a) Pareto efficient? Explain.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fe2b52438-2635-470c-baa2-f7fbb13e3290%2F8cc33126-9170-4b99-94e7-6aa78e63dde4%2Fdpmwyq_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Two roommates, Eric and Noah, decide independently of each other how much
time to spend cleaning the common area of the aparment they share. Specifically, Eric chooses
he 20 (hours per week), while Noah chooses hN 2 0. They both enjoy living in a clean space,
and both pay a cost for cleaning (as it leaves them less time to do other things). Their utility
when the apartment has been cleaned for h hours (where h = hg + hy is the total number of
hours the two roommates spend cleaning) is 20vh, while their hourly cost is a variable c>1.
To summarize, their payoff functions are:
u1 (he, hN) = 20Vhg +hN- chE
lu2(he,hN) = 20 hg + hy – chn.
%3D
(a)
will each roommate spend cleaning?).
Compute the (pure-strategy) symmetric Nash equilibrium (how many hours
Suppose Eric and Noah are getting busy with exams coming up. This increases
(Б)
their cost of cleaning, from c to d > c. What impact does this have on the equilibrium
number of hours they spend cleaning?
(b)
Is the Nash equilibrium computed in (a) Pareto efficient? Explain.
Expert Solution
![](/static/compass_v2/shared-icons/check-mark.png)
This question has been solved!
Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.
This is a popular solution!
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 5 steps with 14 images
![Blurred answer](/static/compass_v2/solution-images/blurred-answer.jpg)
Knowledge Booster
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.Recommended textbooks for you
![ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS](https://compass-isbn-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/isbn_cover_images/9780190931919/9780190931919_smallCoverImage.gif)
![Principles of Economics (12th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134078779/9780134078779_smallCoverImage.gif)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
![Engineering Economy (17th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134870069/9780134870069_smallCoverImage.gif)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
![ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS](https://compass-isbn-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/isbn_cover_images/9780190931919/9780190931919_smallCoverImage.gif)
![Principles of Economics (12th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134078779/9780134078779_smallCoverImage.gif)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
![Engineering Economy (17th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134870069/9780134870069_smallCoverImage.gif)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
![Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781305585126/9781305585126_smallCoverImage.gif)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
![Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781337106665/9781337106665_smallCoverImage.gif)
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
![Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781259290619/9781259290619_smallCoverImage.gif)
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education