Two players simultaneously submits anoffer for a public good. The offer can beeither 2 or 0. The public good is provided ifthe sum of the offers is at least 2. (i.e. if atleast one player offers to pay the cost of thegood). Each player i knows his ownevaluation vi of the public good. They donot know the evaluation of the other. Theyknow that the evaluations can be either 3 or1 with equal probability Player i's payoff ifthe good is provided is vi minus the offer. Ifthe good is not provided, each individual'spayoff is 0 minus the offer.a.) Represent this game using theequivalent normal form.

Answered: Two players simultaneously submits an…

Advanced Engineering Mathematics

10th Edition

ISBN:9780470458365

Author:Erwin Kreyszig

Publisher:Erwin Kreyszig

Chapter2: Second-order Linear Odes

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1RQ

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Two players simultaneously submits an offer for a public good. The offer can be either 2 or 0. The public good is provided if the sum of the offers is at least 2. (i.e. if at least one player offers to pay the cost of the good). Each player i knows his own evaluation vi of the public good. They do