Two investors have each deposited D with a bank. The bank has invested these deposits in a long-term project. If the bank is forced to liquidate its investment before the project matures, a total of 2r can be recovered, where D > r > D/2. If the bank allows the investment to reach maturity, however, the project will pay out a total of 2R, where R > D. There are two dates at which the investors can make with- drawals from the bank: date 1 is before the bank's investment matures; date 2 is after. For simplicity, assume that there is no discounting. If both investors make withdrawals at date 1 then each receives and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then that investor receives D, the other receives 2r – D, and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then the project matures and the investors make withdrawal decisions at date 2. If both investors make withdrawals at date 2 then each receives R and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then that investor receives 2R-D, the other receives D, and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then the bank returns R to each investor and the game ends.
Two investors have each deposited D with a bank. The bank has invested these deposits in a long-term project. If the bank is forced to liquidate its investment before the project matures, a total of 2r can be recovered, where D > r > D/2. If the bank allows the investment to reach maturity, however, the project will pay out a total of 2R, where R > D. There are two dates at which the investors can make with- drawals from the bank: date 1 is before the bank's investment matures; date 2 is after. For simplicity, assume that there is no discounting. If both investors make withdrawals at date 1 then each receives and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then that investor receives D, the other receives 2r – D, and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then the project matures and the investors make withdrawal decisions at date 2. If both investors make withdrawals at date 2 then each receives R and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then that investor receives 2R-D, the other receives D, and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then the bank returns R to each investor and the game ends.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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![### 2.2.B Bank Runs
Two investors have each deposited \( D \) with a bank. The bank has invested these deposits in a long-term project. If the bank is forced to liquidate its investment before the project matures, a total of \( 2r \) can be recovered, where \( D > r > D/2 \). If the bank allows the investment to reach maturity, however, the project will pay out a total of \( 2R \), where \( R > D \).
There are two dates at which the investors can make withdrawals from the bank: date 1 is before the bank's investment matures; date 2 is after. For simplicity, assume that there is no discounting. If both investors make withdrawals at date 1 then each receives \( r \) and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then that investor receives \( D \), the other receives \( 2r - D \), and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then the project matures and the investors make withdrawal decisions at date 2. If both investors make withdrawals at date 2 then each receives \( R \) and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then that investor receives \( 2R - D \), the other receives \( D \), and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then the bank returns \( R \) to each investor and the game ends.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F38f7aa28-9bca-485c-ae70-c259b2e25621%2F49d422c2-b4f3-4e15-89d1-114b60d2643d%2F3g0eeir_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:### 2.2.B Bank Runs
Two investors have each deposited \( D \) with a bank. The bank has invested these deposits in a long-term project. If the bank is forced to liquidate its investment before the project matures, a total of \( 2r \) can be recovered, where \( D > r > D/2 \). If the bank allows the investment to reach maturity, however, the project will pay out a total of \( 2R \), where \( R > D \).
There are two dates at which the investors can make withdrawals from the bank: date 1 is before the bank's investment matures; date 2 is after. For simplicity, assume that there is no discounting. If both investors make withdrawals at date 1 then each receives \( r \) and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then that investor receives \( D \), the other receives \( 2r - D \), and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 1 then the project matures and the investors make withdrawal decisions at date 2. If both investors make withdrawals at date 2 then each receives \( R \) and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then that investor receives \( 2R - D \), the other receives \( D \), and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then the bank returns \( R \) to each investor and the game ends.
![**2.22.** Provide the extensive- and normal-form representations of the bank-runs game discussed in Section 2.2.B. What are the pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria?
(Note: The text prompts the reader to refer to a specific section of a source discussing the bank-runs game, and queries about its strategic representations and equilibria.)](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F38f7aa28-9bca-485c-ae70-c259b2e25621%2F49d422c2-b4f3-4e15-89d1-114b60d2643d%2Fdplv94_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:**2.22.** Provide the extensive- and normal-form representations of the bank-runs game discussed in Section 2.2.B. What are the pure-strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria?
(Note: The text prompts the reader to refer to a specific section of a source discussing the bank-runs game, and queries about its strategic representations and equilibria.)
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