Two hunters have set off to get food from the forest. They have two possible games that they can hunt: either a stag or rabbits. If both players hunt the stag, then they succeed in bringing it down; this gives them both a payoff of 2 units of food. If one player hunts the stag and the other hunts rabbits, then the stag hunter will fail while the rabbit hunter will succeed; i.e. the stag hunter gets a payoff of O while the rabbit hunter gets a payoff of 1. Finally, if both hunters pursue rabbits, they both receive a payoff of 1. The payoff matrix for this game is shown below. Determine all the Nash equilibria of this game (if there are any). (Stag, Stag) and (Rabbit, Rabbit) The game has no Nash equilibrium. O (Rabbit, Rabbit) O (Stag, Stag) STAG STAG (2, 2) RABBIT (1,0) RABBIT (0,1) (1, 1)

Database System Concepts
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Chapter1: Introduction
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Two hunters have set off to get food from the forest. They have two possible games that they can hunt: either a stag or rabbits. If both
players hunt the stag, then they succeed in bringing it down; this gives them both a payoff of 2 units of food. If one player hunts the
stag and the other hunts rabbits, then the stag hunter will fail while the rabbit hunter will succeed; i.e. the stag hunter gets a payoff of
O while the rabbit hunter gets a payoff of 1. Finally, if both hunters pursue rabbits, they both receive a payoff of 1. The payoff
for this game is shown below. Determine all the Nash equilibria of this game (if there are any).
matrix
O (Stag, Stag) and (Rabbit, Rabbit)
O The game has no Nash equilibrium.
O (Rabbit, Rabbit)
O (Stag, Stag)
STAG
RABBIT
STAG
(2, 2)
(1,0)
RABBIT
(0, 1)
(1, 1)
co
Transcribed Image Text:Two hunters have set off to get food from the forest. They have two possible games that they can hunt: either a stag or rabbits. If both players hunt the stag, then they succeed in bringing it down; this gives them both a payoff of 2 units of food. If one player hunts the stag and the other hunts rabbits, then the stag hunter will fail while the rabbit hunter will succeed; i.e. the stag hunter gets a payoff of O while the rabbit hunter gets a payoff of 1. Finally, if both hunters pursue rabbits, they both receive a payoff of 1. The payoff for this game is shown below. Determine all the Nash equilibria of this game (if there are any). matrix O (Stag, Stag) and (Rabbit, Rabbit) O The game has no Nash equilibrium. O (Rabbit, Rabbit) O (Stag, Stag) STAG RABBIT STAG (2, 2) (1,0) RABBIT (0, 1) (1, 1) co
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