Two firms face the following payoff matrix shown to the right. Given these profits, Firm 2 wants to match Firm 1's price, but Firm 1 does not want to match Firm 2's price. Firm 1 Does either firm have a dominant strategy? Firm 1's dominant strategy does not exist and Firm 2's dominant strategy Low Price High Price does not exist $10 Does this game have a unique, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? Low Price O A. The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to pick the low price. $10 $5 O B. The Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to pick the high price and for Firm 2 to pick the low price. Firm 2 $35 $30 O C. The Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to pick the low price and for Firm 2 to pick the high price. High Price D. The game does not have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. $0 $30 O E. The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to pick the high price. Identify all pure- and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to pick the low price with probability and Firm 2 to pick the low price with probability. (Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.)

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Two firms face the following payoff matrix shown to the right. Given these profits,
Firm 2 wants to match Firm 1's price, but Firm 1 does not want to match Firm 2's
price.
Firm 1
Does either firm have a dominant strategy?
Firm 1's dominant strategy does not exist
and Firm 2's dominant strategy
Low Price
High Price
does not exist
$10
Does this game have a unique, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium?
Low Price
O A. The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to pick the low price.
$10
$5
Firm 2
B. The Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to pick the high price and for Firm 2 to
pick the low price.
$35
$30
O C. The Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to pick the low price and for Firm 2 to
pick the high price.
High Price
$0
$30
D. The game does not have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
O E. The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to pick the high price.
Identify all pure- and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria.
The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to pick the low price with
probability
and Firm 2 to pick the low price with probability : (Enter your
response rounded to two decimal places.)
Transcribed Image Text:Two firms face the following payoff matrix shown to the right. Given these profits, Firm 2 wants to match Firm 1's price, but Firm 1 does not want to match Firm 2's price. Firm 1 Does either firm have a dominant strategy? Firm 1's dominant strategy does not exist and Firm 2's dominant strategy Low Price High Price does not exist $10 Does this game have a unique, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium? Low Price O A. The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to pick the low price. $10 $5 Firm 2 B. The Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to pick the high price and for Firm 2 to pick the low price. $35 $30 O C. The Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to pick the low price and for Firm 2 to pick the high price. High Price $0 $30 D. The game does not have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. O E. The Nash equilibrium is for both firms to pick the high price. Identify all pure- and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is for Firm 1 to pick the low price with probability and Firm 2 to pick the low price with probability : (Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.)
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