Two firms compete in the style of Cournot. Both firms have a constant marginal cost. No capacity constraints for either firm. The market demand is linear Q(p) = a - bp. Which of the below can be observed in a Nash equilibrium? O "Firm 1's market share: 40%; firm 2's market share: 60% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.6; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.4." O "Firm 1's market share: 40%; firm 2's market share: 60% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.2; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.3." O "Firm 1's market share: 30%; firm 2's market share: 70% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.5; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.5." O "Firm 1's market share: 40%; firm 2's market share: 60% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.5; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.5." Depending on the cost and demand functions any of the above can be observed in a Nash equilibrium.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question

6.

 

Two firms compete in the style of Cournot. Both firms have a constant marginal cost. No capacity constraints for either firm. The market demand is linear Q(p) =
bp. Which of the below can be observed in a Nash equilibrium?
a -
"Firm 1's market share: 40%; firm 2's market share: 60% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.6; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.4."
"Firm 1's market share: 40%; firm 2's market share: 60% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.2; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.3."
"Firm 1's market share: 30%; firm 2's market share: 70% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.5; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.5."
"Firm 1's market share: 40%; firm 2's market share: 60% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.5; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.5."
Depending on the cost and demand functions any of the above can be observed in a Nash equilibrium.
Transcribed Image Text:Two firms compete in the style of Cournot. Both firms have a constant marginal cost. No capacity constraints for either firm. The market demand is linear Q(p) = bp. Which of the below can be observed in a Nash equilibrium? a - "Firm 1's market share: 40%; firm 2's market share: 60% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.6; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.4." "Firm 1's market share: 40%; firm 2's market share: 60% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.2; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.3." "Firm 1's market share: 30%; firm 2's market share: 70% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.5; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.5." "Firm 1's market share: 40%; firm 2's market share: 60% firm 1's Lerner index: 0.5; firm 2's Lerner index: 0.5." Depending on the cost and demand functions any of the above can be observed in a Nash equilibrium.
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 2 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Depreciation
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education