Three voters vote over two candidates (A and B), and each voter has two pure strategies: vote for A and vote for B. When A wins, voter 1 gets a payoff of 1, and 2 and 3 get payoffs of 0; when B wins, 1 gets 0 and 2 and 3 get 1. Thus, 1 prefers A, and 2 and 3 prefer B. The candidate getting 2 or more votes is the winner (majority rule). Find a weakly dominant strategy. Compute for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Three voters vote over two candidates (A and B), and each voter has two pure strategies: vote for A and vote for B. When A wins, voter 1 gets a payoff of 1, and 2 and 3 get payoffs of 0; when B wins, 1 gets 0 and 2 and 3 get 1. Thus, 1 prefers A, and 2 and 3 prefer B. The candidate getting 2 or more votes is the winner (majority rule). Find a weakly dominant strategy. Compute for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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