thority would be likely to block this merger. [max: 50 words] 2. There are n ≥ 2 profit-maximising firms producing a homogeneous good, competing in quantity, and facing the inverse demand function P(Q) = 10-Q, where Q = Σi=19i is the total quantity produced in the market. Each firm i faces the same linear cost function: C(q) = 2qi. (a) Find the total quantity produced and the equilibrium price. (d) For what values of n are consumers strictly worse off under the cartel than under competition? (e) Comparing the competitive price (found in (a)), the cartel price (found in (c)), and the price that the cartel would set if there were no competition authority, how effective is the competition authority at keeping the price low?
thority would be likely to block this merger. [max: 50 words] 2. There are n ≥ 2 profit-maximising firms producing a homogeneous good, competing in quantity, and facing the inverse demand function P(Q) = 10-Q, where Q = Σi=19i is the total quantity produced in the market. Each firm i faces the same linear cost function: C(q) = 2qi. (a) Find the total quantity produced and the equilibrium price. (d) For what values of n are consumers strictly worse off under the cartel than under competition? (e) Comparing the competitive price (found in (a)), the cartel price (found in (c)), and the price that the cartel would set if there were no competition authority, how effective is the competition authority at keeping the price low?
MATLAB: An Introduction with Applications
6th Edition
ISBN:9781119256830
Author:Amos Gilat
Publisher:Amos Gilat
Chapter1: Starting With Matlab
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1P
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please do only part D and E in 30-40 minutes will upvote ...hand written plzzz
![thority would be likely to block this merger. [max: 50 words]
2. There are n ≥ 2 profit-maximising firms producing a homogeneous good, competing in
quantity, and facing the inverse demand function P(Q) = 10-Q, where Q = Σi=19i
is the total quantity produced in the market. Each firm i faces the same linear cost
function: C(q) = 2qi.
(a) Find the total quantity produced and the equilibrium price.
(d) For what values of n are consumers strictly worse off under the cartel than under
competition?
(e) Comparing the competitive price (found in (a)), the cartel price (found in (c)),
and the price that the cartel would set if there were no competition authority, how
effective is the competition authority at keeping the price low?](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F386a0966-ab35-4abf-bd68-6e9e650bf9c1%2F2a3f4973-ba75-44ea-9f50-ee10727ba7a2%2Fp8r1jn_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:thority would be likely to block this merger. [max: 50 words]
2. There are n ≥ 2 profit-maximising firms producing a homogeneous good, competing in
quantity, and facing the inverse demand function P(Q) = 10-Q, where Q = Σi=19i
is the total quantity produced in the market. Each firm i faces the same linear cost
function: C(q) = 2qi.
(a) Find the total quantity produced and the equilibrium price.
(d) For what values of n are consumers strictly worse off under the cartel than under
competition?
(e) Comparing the competitive price (found in (a)), the cartel price (found in (c)),
and the price that the cartel would set if there were no competition authority, how
effective is the competition authority at keeping the price low?
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