Q. 22 Art. 4 Pt. 1 GOD AND THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES (Metaph. xii. 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things. On the contrary, It is said (Job xxxiv. 13): What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made? On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv. 20): Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made. I answer that, Two things belong to provi- dence-namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execu- tion of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immedi- ate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He as- signs to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's provi- dence; for He governs things inferior by su- perior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De provid. viii. 3), is exploded. He taught a three- fold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be gen- erated and corrupted, he attributed to the di- vinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move cor- poreal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, be assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei 1, 2: viii. 14). Reply Obj. 1. It perta is to a king's dignity to have ministers who exaute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it con- siders the particular things with which its action is concerned. Reply Obj. 2. God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above (Q. 19, AA. 5, 8). Reply Obj. 3. It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is bet- ter and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; and because the 124 thought of evil sometimes perverts the will to- wards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil. FOURTH ARTICLE Whether Providence Imposes Any Necessity on Things Foreseen? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:- Objection 1. It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a per se cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi. 7). But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore di- vine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen. Obj. 2. Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He as- signs the stability of necessity to things pro- vided. Obj. 3. Further, Boëthius says (De Consol. iv. 6): Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and for- tunes by the indissoluble connection of causes. It seems therfore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. On the contrary, Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv. 23) to corrupt nature is not the work of providence. But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency. I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an ex- trinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the uni- verse; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. dence is not only that things should happen Reply Obj. 1. The effect of divine provi- somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to hap- pen infallibly and of necessity happens infal- libly and of necessity; and that happens from THIRD ARTICLE Whether God Has Immediate Providence over Everything? We proceed thus to the Third Article:-- Objection 1. It seems that God has not im- mediate providence over all things. For what- ever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to Go But it belongs to the dignity of a king, fat he should have minis- ters; through whe mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things. Obj. 2. Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be with- drawn. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Enchir. 17) that, It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things: and the Philosopher says the same