Think of two period bargaining game in which a consumer and a seller trade a good. The consumer buys a good if its price p is less than the value 10. The seller sells a good if its price p is higher than the cost 5. The timing is like. The seller firsts offer p first then the consumer decides to take or leave. If the consumer takes it, its payoff is p-c for the seller and v-p for the consumer. If it is rejected, the consumer offers another offer p2 to the seller. Again, if the seller accepts, the payoff is p2-c for the seller and v-p2 for the consumer. Moreover, there are discount factors delta 1=0.8 for the seller and delta 2=0.7 for the buyer in the second period. 1) In the 2nd stage (i.e. when the buyer offers p2), the consumer offers p2= 2) In the first stage, (i.e. when the seller offers p), the seller offers p= 3) At the equilibrium, the payoffs are that the buyer's payoff is and the seller is supposed to accept all offer if p2 is greater and equal to and the buyer takes all offers if p is less than equal to while the seller's payoff is

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
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Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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It's a game theory bargaining game problem.

I'm not familiar with cursive writing.

Think of two period bargaining game in which a consumer and a seller trade a good.
The consumer buys a good if its price p is less than the value 10. The seller sells a good if its pricep is higher than the cost 5.
The timing is like. The seller firsts offer p first then the consumer decides to take or leave. If the consumer takes it, its payoff is p-c for the seller and v-p for the consumer. If it is
rejected, the consumer offers another offer p2 to the seller. Again, if the seller accepts, the payoff is p2-c for the seller and v-p2 for the consumer.
Moreover, there are discount factors delta1=0.8 for the seller and delta2=0.7 for the buyer in the second period.
1) In the 2nd stage (i.e. when the buyer offers p2), the consumer offers p2=
and the seller is supposed to accept all offer if p2 is greater and equal to
2) In the first stage, (i.e. when the seller offers p), the seller offers p=
and the buyer takes all offers if p is less than equal to
3) At the equilibrium, the payoffs are that the buyer's payoff is
while the seller's payoff is
Transcribed Image Text:Think of two period bargaining game in which a consumer and a seller trade a good. The consumer buys a good if its price p is less than the value 10. The seller sells a good if its pricep is higher than the cost 5. The timing is like. The seller firsts offer p first then the consumer decides to take or leave. If the consumer takes it, its payoff is p-c for the seller and v-p for the consumer. If it is rejected, the consumer offers another offer p2 to the seller. Again, if the seller accepts, the payoff is p2-c for the seller and v-p2 for the consumer. Moreover, there are discount factors delta1=0.8 for the seller and delta2=0.7 for the buyer in the second period. 1) In the 2nd stage (i.e. when the buyer offers p2), the consumer offers p2= and the seller is supposed to accept all offer if p2 is greater and equal to 2) In the first stage, (i.e. when the seller offers p), the seller offers p= and the buyer takes all offers if p is less than equal to 3) At the equilibrium, the payoffs are that the buyer's payoff is while the seller's payoff is
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