There are N sites that need protection (number them 1 to N). Someone is going to pick one of them to attack, and you must pick one to protect. Suppose that the attacker is going to attack site i with probability q,. You plan on selecting a site to protect, with probability P, of selecting site i. The choice of {q,} and {p,} represent the attacker's and defender's

A First Course in Probability (10th Edition)
10th Edition
ISBN:9780134753119
Author:Sheldon Ross
Publisher:Sheldon Ross
Chapter1: Combinatorial Analysis
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1.1P: a. How many different 7-place license plates are possible if the first 2 places are for letters and...
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There are N sites that need protection (number them 1 to N). Someone is going to pick one of them to attack, and you must pick one to protect. Suppose that the attacker is going to attack site i with probability \( q_i \). You plan on selecting a site to protect, with probability \( p_i \) of selecting site i. The choice of \(\{q_i\}\) and \(\{p_i\}\) represent the attacker’s and defender’s strategy, respectively.
Transcribed Image Text:There are N sites that need protection (number them 1 to N). Someone is going to pick one of them to attack, and you must pick one to protect. Suppose that the attacker is going to attack site i with probability \( q_i \). You plan on selecting a site to protect, with probability \( p_i \) of selecting site i. The choice of \(\{q_i\}\) and \(\{p_i\}\) represent the attacker’s and defender’s strategy, respectively.
**Text for Educational Website:**

**G)** If both attacker and defender are trying to maximize and minimize (respectively) the probability of a successful attack, what strategies are they going to end up following?

**H)** If both attacker and defender are trying to maximize and minimize (respectively) the expected cost of an attack, what strategies are they going to end up following?

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**Explanation:**

This content discusses strategic interactions between an attacker and a defender. The focus is on two scenarios:

1. **Probability of a Successful Attack**: Both parties are focused on either increasing or decreasing the chances of a successful attack. Understanding their strategies can shed light on how security measures are countered and optimized.

2. **Expected Cost of an Attack**: This looks at the financial implications, factoring in both maximizing and minimizing costs. These strategies are crucial for assessing economic trade-offs in security planning and threat mitigation. 

By examining these scenarios, strategies to either enhance or prevent successful attacks, as well as manage costs, can be better understood.
Transcribed Image Text:**Text for Educational Website:** **G)** If both attacker and defender are trying to maximize and minimize (respectively) the probability of a successful attack, what strategies are they going to end up following? **H)** If both attacker and defender are trying to maximize and minimize (respectively) the expected cost of an attack, what strategies are they going to end up following? --- **Explanation:** This content discusses strategic interactions between an attacker and a defender. The focus is on two scenarios: 1. **Probability of a Successful Attack**: Both parties are focused on either increasing or decreasing the chances of a successful attack. Understanding their strategies can shed light on how security measures are countered and optimized. 2. **Expected Cost of an Attack**: This looks at the financial implications, factoring in both maximizing and minimizing costs. These strategies are crucial for assessing economic trade-offs in security planning and threat mitigation. By examining these scenarios, strategies to either enhance or prevent successful attacks, as well as manage costs, can be better understood.
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