The cost of reducing lead contamination of water for BigManufacture Inc. is shown in the table below. BigManufacture Inc currently releases lead in to the local waterways at a concentration of 5 parts per billion. The government regulations sets a limit to the lead pollution at 2 parts per billion accompanied by a $30,000 fine per year for each part per billion beyond the 2 part limit. What is BigManufacture Inc likely to do? Reduction of Lead Cost By 1 part per billion $20,000/year By 2 parts per billion $45,000/year By 3 parts per billion $80,000/year Group of answer choices Reduce lead pollution by 1 part per billion. Reduce lead pollution by 2 parts per billion. Reduce lead pollution by 0 part per billion. Reduce lead pollution by 3 parts per billion.

Gozilla Inc. can generate 100 (CO2) emissions without any regulation. The marginal control cost for Gozilla Inc., associated with emission reduction, is known MC=20+0.5Q where Q is reduced units. Suppose that the regulator impose an emission standard on Gozilla: According to the emission standard, the factory is allowed to emit 40 units. The level of reduction in the emission standard could be accomplished through an emission charge (quantity tax or penalty fee on emission). An emission charge of per emission unit would generate the target amount of reduction. Total (tax) revenue the regulator will collect as emission charges would be Hint: Type integers. Do not use thousands separators.

Appalachian Coal Mining believes that it can increase labor productivity and, therefore, net revenue by reducing air pollution in its mines. It estimates that the marginal cost function for reducing pollution by installing additional capital equipment is  MC = 40P where P represents a reduction of one unit of pollution in the mines. It also feels that for every unit of pollution reduction, the marginal increase in revenue (MR) is  MR = 1,000 - 10P How much pollution reduction should Appalachian Coal Mining undertake? Please provide the correct answer. Thank you!

Two firms are covered by a tradable permit system. Firm one has a marginal abatement cost given by MAC1 = 8 - E1 and firm two has a marginal abatement cost given by MAC2 = 8 - E2, where MAC is measured in dollars/ton and E in tons/hour. If each firm is given permits for 3 tons/hour of pollution and they are allowed to trade, what will the permit price (in $/ton) be?

How do you get this answer?

Suppose the Ontario government has the following information: the emission reduction cost for an industry is estimated to be MAC = 500 – 2E and the estimated damage cost function is MD = 0.5E. What would be the optimal emission standard set by the government and what would be the total emission reduction costs for the industry to meet the standard? please include a graph

Suppose that a firm's marginal abatement cost function with existing technologies is MAC = 8 - E. If the firm adopts new pollution abatement technologies, then its marginal abatement cost function will be MAC = 4 - 0.5E. If the government raises the tax on emissions from $1 to $3, then the benefits of adopting new technologies increase by $_. (Hint: when not considering adoption costs, benefits are simply defined by changes in total compliance costs.) Please round your final answer to two decimal places if necessary. Answer:

The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency investigates how emissions of an environmentally hazardous substance from an industrial sector should be regulated, either through a tax on the emissions or through a quantitative regulation (limit value). As this is a new substance (new substance), knowledge of the level of environmental damage and the costs of reducing emissions is uncertain. In more technical terms: the regulatory authorities do not have complete information on the positions on either the dD / dM curve (marginal damages) or the MAC curve (marginal abatement costs). a) Explain and show graphically whether - and if so how - the uncertainty about the position of the MAC curve affects the choice between regulating emissions with a tax or limit value from a socio-economic efficiency perspective. b) Explain and show graphically whether - and if so how - the uncertainty about the position of the dD / dM curve affects the choice between regulating emissions with a tax or limit…

QA and QS are the pollution levels for Arrow and Solow Industries, respectively. Profits (benefits) associatedwith polluting activity, πi(i = A, S) are πA=10QA−0.5QA2 and πS=20QS−QS2. The marginal benefits (profits) for each firm are MBA=10−QA and  MBS=20−2QS. 2.9 Suppose Arrow is located in a remote rural area, with very low pollution levels (marginal damage = 6), while Solow is located in an urban area, with other pollution sources and many more people exposed (marginal damage = 12). What is the efficient pollution allocation in this case? Note: question puts us back in the world of economic efficiency (i.e., where we maximize net social benefit) as opposed to the world of cost- efficiency where we minimize costs associated with reaching an environmental target. So here net benefit is equal to Benefits from pollution minus Pollution Damages. Since locations are not interdependent, you can find the pollution levels which maximize net social benefits from A’s pollution and then…

Kk.37.