The Cost Associated with the Asset Substitution Problem Unoit Industries has two mutually exclusive €50 million investment opportunities, R and S, which it plans to fund with debt. Project S pays off €60 million for certain, and project R pays off only €20 million when the economy is poor and €90 million when the economy is good. For simplicity, assume that investors are risk neutral. a What is the NPV of each project, assuming the economy is equally likely to be favourable or unfavourable, and the discount rate is 0 per cent? Suppose Unoit can raise the £50 million by issuing a bond with a face value of £50 million (because the lender naively believes the company will take the safe project). b Which project will Unoit shareholders prefer? c What is the expected pay-off to the naive lenders? Now suppose the debt holders are sophisticated. d What must the debt holders be promised, which project will the company select, and what do the shareholders gain? Answer: a NPV = 0.5(£60 million) + 0.5(£60 million) - £50 million = £10 million NPVR = 0.5(£20 million) + 0.5(£90 million) - £50 million = £5 million b With naive debt holders, the pay-off to equity holders with project S is 0.5(£60 million - £50 million) + 0.5(£60 million + £50 million) = £10 million The pay-off to equity holders with project R is 0.5 (£0) + 0.5(£90 million - £50 million) = £20 million Thus, if the firm's managers act in the interest of shareholders, they will choose project R. c d Given that project R is chosen, the naive debt holders do not receive full payment in the poor state of the economy. On average, they receive only 0.5(£20 million) + 0.5(£50 million) = £35 million. Sophisticated lenders, aware of both projects, will realize that equity holders have an incentive to invest in the riskier project. For the £50 million loan, they will require a promised future payment of £80 million. With the selection of project R, they receive an expected pay-off of 0.5(£20 million) +0.5 (£80 million) = £50 million, so on average they recover their investment. In this situation, the pay-off to equity holders selecting project R is 0.5(0) + 0.5(£90 million - £80 million) = £5 million. The pay-off is zero if project S is selected, because in neither state of the economy can the £80 million obligation be met Thus equity holders will select proiect R despite its lower NPV If

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Chapter1: Investments: Background And Issues
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In this question they say that lenders would need a promised payment of 80 million. How is this solved for in question d. How can i derive this mathmatically

The Cost Associated with the Asset Substitution Problem
Unoit Industries has two mutually exclusive €50 million investment opportunities, R and S, which
it plans to fund with debt. Project S pays off €60 million for certain, and project R pays off only
€20 million when the economy is poor and €90 million when the economy is good. For simplicity,
assume that investors are risk neutral.
la What is the NPV of each project, assuming the economy is equally likely to be favourable or
unfavourable, and the discount rate is 0 per cent?
Suppose Unoit can raise the £50 million by issuing a bond with a face value of £50 million (because
the lender naively believes the company will take the safe project).
b Which project will Unoit shareholders prefer?
c What is the expected pay-off to the naive lenders?
Now suppose the debt holders are sophisticated.
d What must the debt holders be promised, which project will the company select, and what do the
shareholders gain?
Answer:
ja NPV, = 0.5(£60 million) + 0.5(£60 million) - £50 million = £10 million
NPVR = 0.5(£20 million) + 0.5(£90 million) – £50 million = £5 million
%3D
b With naive debt holders, the pay-off to equity holders with project S is
0.5(£60 million - £50 million) + 0.5(£60 million -£50 million) = £10 million
The pay-off to equity holders with project R is
|0.5(£0) + 0.5(£90 million - £50 million) = £20 million
Thus, if the firm's managers act in the interest of shareholders, they will choose project R.
c Given that project R is chosen, the naive debt holders do not receive full payment in the poor state
of the economy. On average, they receive only 0.5(£20 million) + 0.5(£50 million) = £35 million.
d Sophisticated lenders, aware of both projects, will realize that equity holders have an incentive to
invest in the riskier project. For the £50 million loan, they will require a promised future payment of
\£80 million, With the selection of project R, they receive an expected pay-off of 0.5(£20 million)
+ 0.5(£80 million) = £50 million, so on average they recover their investment. In this situation,
the pay-off to equity holders selecting project R is 0.5(0) + 0.5(£90 million – £80 million) = £5
million. The pay-off is zero if project S is selected, because in neither state of the economy can the
£80 million obligation be met. Thus equity holders will select project R despite its lower NPV. If
they had been able to commit to taking project S, equity holders would have created and been
able to capture £10 million instead of £5 million in NPV.
Transcribed Image Text:The Cost Associated with the Asset Substitution Problem Unoit Industries has two mutually exclusive €50 million investment opportunities, R and S, which it plans to fund with debt. Project S pays off €60 million for certain, and project R pays off only €20 million when the economy is poor and €90 million when the economy is good. For simplicity, assume that investors are risk neutral. la What is the NPV of each project, assuming the economy is equally likely to be favourable or unfavourable, and the discount rate is 0 per cent? Suppose Unoit can raise the £50 million by issuing a bond with a face value of £50 million (because the lender naively believes the company will take the safe project). b Which project will Unoit shareholders prefer? c What is the expected pay-off to the naive lenders? Now suppose the debt holders are sophisticated. d What must the debt holders be promised, which project will the company select, and what do the shareholders gain? Answer: ja NPV, = 0.5(£60 million) + 0.5(£60 million) - £50 million = £10 million NPVR = 0.5(£20 million) + 0.5(£90 million) – £50 million = £5 million %3D b With naive debt holders, the pay-off to equity holders with project S is 0.5(£60 million - £50 million) + 0.5(£60 million -£50 million) = £10 million The pay-off to equity holders with project R is |0.5(£0) + 0.5(£90 million - £50 million) = £20 million Thus, if the firm's managers act in the interest of shareholders, they will choose project R. c Given that project R is chosen, the naive debt holders do not receive full payment in the poor state of the economy. On average, they receive only 0.5(£20 million) + 0.5(£50 million) = £35 million. d Sophisticated lenders, aware of both projects, will realize that equity holders have an incentive to invest in the riskier project. For the £50 million loan, they will require a promised future payment of \£80 million, With the selection of project R, they receive an expected pay-off of 0.5(£20 million) + 0.5(£80 million) = £50 million, so on average they recover their investment. In this situation, the pay-off to equity holders selecting project R is 0.5(0) + 0.5(£90 million – £80 million) = £5 million. The pay-off is zero if project S is selected, because in neither state of the economy can the £80 million obligation be met. Thus equity holders will select project R despite its lower NPV. If they had been able to commit to taking project S, equity holders would have created and been able to capture £10 million instead of £5 million in NPV.
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