The cartel of copper exporting countries is called COPEC. As part of an international trade agreement, the United States has agreed to buy all the copper that COPEC wants to sell to the United States at a constant price of $100 per tonne. COPEC also sells copper in Europe at a price of $150 per tonne. COPEC acts just like a monopolist; if it finds it is profit maximising to sell in the United States at $100 per tonne and simultaneously to sell in Europe for $150 a tonne, what is the price elasticity of demand of COPEC’s copper in the European market? Carefully explain all the steps in the derivation of the value of the elasticity including the underlying economic theory approach behind it

The cartel of copper exporting countries is called COPEC. As part of an international trade agreement, the United States has agreed to buy all the copper that COPEC wants to sell to the United States at a constant price of $100 per tonne. COPEC also sells copper in Europe at a price of $150 per tonne. COPEC acts just like a monopolist; if it finds it is profit maximising to sell in the United States at $100 per tonne and simultaneously to sell in Europe for $150 a tonne, what is the price elasticity of demand of COPEC’s copper in the European market? Carefully explain all the steps in the derivation of the value of the elasticity including the underlying economic theory approach behind it

Micro Economics For Today

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613064

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 13SQ

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The cartel of copper exporting countries is called COPEC. As part of an international trade agreement, the United States has agreed to buy all the copper that COPEC wants to sell to the United States at a constant price of $100 per tonne. COPEC also sells copper in Europe at a price of $150 per tonne. COPEC acts just like a monopolist; if it finds it is profit maximising to sell in the United States at $100 per tonne and simultaneously to sell in Europe for $150 a tonne, what is the price elasticity of demand of COPEC’s copper in the European market?
Table: Market for Oil World Price (per barrel) World Quantity (MBD) $36.00 100 37.50 98 47.50 82 50.00 80 Suppose that oil is produced by 10 countries, each of which produces 10 million barrels of oil a day (MBD) for a total of 100 MBD. The world price of oil at this quantity is $36 per barrel, so each country earns $360 million a day. Suppose that these countries form a cartel and each country produces 8 MBD. If nine of the cartel members cheat and produce 10 MBD while one country keeps its promise and maintains production at 8 MBD, each cheater will earn revenue of: $375 million a day, while the noncheating country will earn $360 million a day. $400 million a day, while the noncheating country will earn $360 million a day. $400 million a day, while the noncheating country will earn $300 million a day. $375 million a day, while the noncheating country will earn $300 million a day.
In the United States cartels are
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COPEC is the acronym for the cartel of copper-exporting countries. As part of an international trade deal, the US has pledged to acquire all of the copper that COPEC wishes to sell to the US at a constant price of $100 per tonne. Copper is also sold in Europe by COPEC at a price of $150 per tonne. COPEC acts like a monopolist -if it is profit maximising to sell in the United States at $100 per tonne and simultaneously to sell in Europe for $150 a tonne, what is the price elasticity of demand of COPEC’s copper in the European market? Explain each stage in the development of the elasticity's value, including the underlying economic theory method.
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Imagine there are two companies, East Wafer and West Wafer, which produce silicon wafers, the base component in the microchips which constitute the brains of our computers. Below is the daily demand for silicon wafers Suppose, for simplicity, East Wafer and West Wafer have the same constant cost structure, so maximizing total revenue maximizes profit. If East Wafer and West Wafer are able to form a cartel and collude without cheating on each other, what will be the price of a silicon wafer? $40 $50 $60 $70
A two-firm coal cartel that produces at a constant marginal cost of £22 faces a market inverse demand curve of P= 102 - 0.47Q. Initially, both firms agree to act like a monopolist, each producing 42.55 tonnes of coal. If one of the firms cheats on the agreement (assuming the other firm is compliant and continues to produce at 42.55 tonnes), to within 2 decimal places (e.g. 1.92) the cheating firm will produce 数字 tonnes of coal.