(Table: Firms A and B X) Two firms have formed an agreement to restrict output. Firm B Restrict Output Expand Output 100, 100 60,130 Firm A Restrict Output Expand Output 130,60 75,75 They are playing an infinitely repeated game in which output decisions must be made every period. Both firms are using grim trigger strategies. If d (discount rate) = 0.80, Firm B's expected payoff from cheating on the agreement is

(Table: Firms A and B X) Two firms have formed an agreement to restrict output. Firm B Restrict Output Expand Output 100, 100 60,130 Firm A Restrict Output Expand Output 130,60 75,75 They are playing an infinitely repeated game in which output decisions must be made every period. Both firms are using grim trigger strategies. If d (discount rate) = 0.80, Firm B's expected payoff from cheating on the agreement is

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3SCQ: Consider the curve in the figure below, which shows the market demand. marginal cost, and marginal...

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Ans yes or no
Karen goes to the casino with 1000$ and plays the following strategy: In her first game, she putsin 1$. If she wins, she finishes playing and takes her profit home. If she looses a game, she willplay another game and put in twice as much money as she did in the previous game. If she wins,she will finish playing and take her profits home. She will keep going with that strategy, untilshe either wins a game or runs out of money.(a) Create a table for n = 1, 2, ..., 10 which lists: (a) The amount of money she puts in in game n;(b) the sum of the amount of money she has put in in all games up to this game n; and (c)her overall profit if the game n is the first game she wins.(b) What is the likelihood of her loosing 8 games in a row?(c) How many games can she loose in a row before she cannot afford to continue with herstrategy of doubling her bet?(d) Given the low likelihood of loosing, is this a smart strategy for Karen to pursue?
1
Ans both Otherwise dont ans
(2) Two competing firms are each planning to introduce a new product. Each will decide whether to produce Product A, Product B, or Product C. They will make their choices at the same time. The resulting payoffs are shown below. Firm 2 A В C -10, -10 10, 0 20, 10 0, 10 -20, -20 15, -5 10, 20 -5, 15 -30, -30 А Firm 1 B C a. Are there any Nash equilibria in pure strategies? If so, what are they? b. If both firms use maxmin strategies, what outcome will result? c. If Firm 1 uses a maxmin strategy and Firm 2 knows this, what will Firm 2 do?
Solve the problem n give typed answer fast
12. Consider a game where each player picks a number from 0 to 60. The guess that is closest to half ofthe average of the chosen numbers wins a prize. If several peopleare equally close, then they share theprize. The game theory implies that (A) all players have dominant strategies to choose 0 (B) all players have dominant strategies to choose 30 (C) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick 0 (D) there is a Nash equilibrium where all players pick positive numbers 13. Behavioral data in such games suggests that (A) most subjects choose 0; (B) most subjects choose 30; (C) common answers include 30, 15, 7.5, and 0; (D) most subjects use randomization. Can you help me answer number 13 please?
Real Options & Game Theory Is the following statement true or false (explain your answer): In any strategic-form game, if a player has a dominant strategy, then all of the other strategies of that player are dominated.
please fast 28.
Real Options & Game Theory Does either player have a dominant strategy? If yes, list it/them Do any have a STRICTLY dominated strategy? If so, list it/them
09 J0 ino 09 Which of these must be TRUE of a prisoner's dilemma outcome? O There exists no other outcome that is better for both players. Neither player has a dominant strategy in the game. O There is no opportunity to collude or cooperate to improve both players' payoffs. O It is a Nash equilibrium resulting from each player using its best-response strategies.
4. The following payoff matrix shows the profit payoff to firms A and B from combinations of price strategies HI and LO. A НІ LOW B HI (6, 6) (16, -5) LOW (-7, 15) (0, 0) (a) In a one period game, what strategy would each firm follow, and why? Determine the equilibrium on the one-period game. (b) Now assume the game is infinite in length. Firm B goes HI in period 1 and continues with HI so long as A does as well. Firm A is deciding between HI and LO. Determine the range of discount rates for which HI is the better choice for Firm A.