Suppose you have two persons, one with more elastic demand for medical care than the other. If they both obtain identical health insurance coverage (or both have their % of costs paid by insurance increased), whose demand will be affected most? Given what you know about relative demand for MC for well vs. ill individuals, more educated vs. less educated persons, and wealthy vs. less wealthy individuals, which of each pair will have the greatest increase in demand under health insurance?

Moral hazard creates tradeoffs that complicate insurance design and policy choices. Imagine a linear demand curve for outpatient clinician visits, and assume at $100 per visit there would be 50,000 annual visits to a particular urban clinic. A politician would like to be popular, and proposes making clinic visits free (zero price). You know, as the city's staff health economist, that if this were to happen, the number of visits would rise to 75,000. Your job is to testify before the city council, and answer at least two questions: how much social welfare loss from moral hazard would occur; and how much tax money must be raised to finance clinic services if visits were made completely free? a. $2,500,000; $15,000,000 b. $5,000,000; $30,000,000 c. $1,250,000; $7,500,000 d. $3,750,000; $22,500,000

Suppose, if ill, that Fred’s demand for health services is summarized by the demand curve Q = 50 − 2P , where P is the price of services. How many services does he buy at a price of $20? Suppose that Fred’s probability of illness is 0.25. What is the actuarially fair price of health insurance for Fred with a zero coinsurance rate? If the insurance company pays Fred’s entire loss, will the insurance company offer him insurance at the actuarially fair rate? Why? Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.

Suppose a household's income rose from 45k to 60k while their spending on health increased from 2k to 5k. 1. What is the income elasticity of demand for health? 2. What does this income elasticity of demand mean for this family?

1. An individual has a health insurance plan with a deductible of $1200 and a coinsurance rate of 50%. Their demand curve is Q=20-(P/10), and the equilibrium market price of medical care is $100 per unit. What quantity of medical care would the individual choose to consume? 2. Suppose that consumers are all risk neutral and so they do not purchase health insurance. The equilibrium price of a doctor visit is $30, the supply of doctor visits is perfectly elastic, and the aggregate demand for doctor visits is given by Q=200-5*P. Calculate the effect that universal perfect health insurance (that is, coinsurance rate=0) would have on social welfare, measured as the sum of consumer surplus plus producer surplus. 3. Consider a version of the Akerlof model in which neither buyers nor sellers observe car quality (though somehow – please suspend your disbelief – both buyers and sellers enjoy higher utility from higher quality cars). For this question, please assume that both buyers…

Suppose the government imposes a system of price ceilings in the health care industry as part of an overall health care reform bill. a) draw a graph of the health care market and show equilibrium price and quantity.  b) assume the government imposes an effective price ceiling in the health care market. Show the price ceiling in your graph. Indicate what will happen to quantity demanded and quantity supplied of health over time ? c) would a shortage or surplus result ? I llustrate in your graph.

Health Care Demand An individual's demand for physician office visits in a given year is given by, Q = 11-0.045P, where Q is the number of office visits and P is the out-of-pocket price paid by the individual for each visit. Assume the market price of an office visit is $180. Use this information to answer the questions below. Questions: 1. Without insurance, how many office visits will the individual make in one year? NOTE: Enter a formula to calculate the number of visits, rounding your answer to the nearest whole number. 2. Suppose the individual has insurance and pays only a $40 copayment for each visit. How many office visits will the individual make in one year? NOTE: Again, enter a formula, rounding your answer to the nearest whole number. 3. What is the moral hazard and deadweight loss (DWL) associated with having insurance? NOTE: Enter formulas in the respective boxes below. Moral Hazard: DWL: 4. Based on the Nyman model, suppose the value the individual places on each visit…

All other things equal, if an individual earning $100,000 per year has an income elasticity of demand for health care of 0.4, if her salary increases by 10%, her expenditures on health care will increase by $4,000.  True  False

Assume a consumer's demand for a medical service is as follows: Q = 100 - Pp where Pp is the out-of-pocket price she actually faces. She is considering four different insurance options: uninsurance, full insurance, a 50% coinsurance plan, and a copayment plan with a $25 copay. Assume this service has a list price of PL = $70. Calculate Q under each insurance plan. Please fill in the final answer without showing the middle steps (a number only, without any extra space, symbol, word, etc.) If the customer is uninsured, Q= • If the customer is fully insured, Q= • If the customer has a 50% coinsurance plan, Q= • If the customer has the copayment plan, Q=

Explain how each of these situations will affect the quantity demanded of health insurance:   d) New technologies that enable medical illness to be predicted more accurately.   e) A tendency among buyers to become less risk, on average.