Suppose that there are two types of cars, good and bad. The qualities of cars are not observable but are known to the sellers. Risk-neutral buyers and sellers have their own valuation of these two types of cars as provided in the table, Types of Cars Good (50% probability) Bad (50% probability) Buyer's Valuation Seller's Valuation 5,000 4,500 2,500 3,000 Now suppose that sellers value a good car at $4,500 and a bad car at $2,500, and quality is not observed by the buyers. What is the highest price that risk-neutral buyers will offer for a used car if they recognize adverse selection?

A First Course in Probability (10th Edition)
10th Edition
ISBN:9780134753119
Author:Sheldon Ross
Publisher:Sheldon Ross
Chapter1: Combinatorial Analysis
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Problem 1.1P: a. How many different 7-place license plates are possible if the first 2 places are for letters and...
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$2,500
$3,000
$4,000
$4,500
Transcribed Image Text:Multiple Choice $2,500 $3,000 $4,000 $4,500
Suppose that there are two types of cars, good and bad. The qualities of cars are not observable but are known to the sellers. Risk-neutral
buyers and sellers have their own valuation of these two types of cars as provided in the teble.
Types of Cars
Good (50% probability)
Bad (50% probability)
Buyer's Valuation
Seller's Valuation
5,000
4,500
3,000
2,500
Now suppose that sellers value a good car at $4,500 and a bad car at $2,500, and quality is not observed by the buyers. What is the highest
price that risk-neutral buyers will offer for a used car if they recognize adverse selection?
Transcribed Image Text:Suppose that there are two types of cars, good and bad. The qualities of cars are not observable but are known to the sellers. Risk-neutral buyers and sellers have their own valuation of these two types of cars as provided in the teble. Types of Cars Good (50% probability) Bad (50% probability) Buyer's Valuation Seller's Valuation 5,000 4,500 3,000 2,500 Now suppose that sellers value a good car at $4,500 and a bad car at $2,500, and quality is not observed by the buyers. What is the highest price that risk-neutral buyers will offer for a used car if they recognize adverse selection?
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