Suppose that there are two farmers, Earl and Pearl, who graze their milk cows on the common pasture of their village. Each farmer can purchase up to two cows, and the more cows that are on the pasture, the less grass there will be per cow, meaning each cow will produce less milk. Suppose that cows cost $500 each and milk sells for $2 per litre. The following table summarizes the production of each cow given the number in the pasture. Number of Litres of Milk Cows Per Cow 2. 800 3 600 4 500 What is profit of each farmer in the Nash equilibrium? What would be the efficient number of cows?

Suppose that there are two farmers, Earl and Pearl, who graze their milk cows on the common pasture of their village. Each farmer can purchase up to two cows, and the more cows that are on the pasture, the less grass there will be per cow, meaning each cow will produce less milk. Suppose that cows cost $500 each and milk sells for $2 per litre. The following table summarizes the production of each cow given the number in the pasture. Number of Litres of Milk Cows Per Cow 2. 800 3 600 4 500 What is profit of each farmer in the Nash equilibrium? What would be the efficient number of cows?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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