Suppose Erie Textiles can dispose of its waste "for free" by dumping it into a nearby river. While the firm benefits from dumping waste into the river, the waste reduces the fish and bird reproduction. This causes damage to local fishermen and bird watchers. At a cost, Erie Textiles can filter out the toxins, in which case local fishermen and bird watchers will not suffer any damage. The relevant gains (in thousands of dollars) and losses for the three parties are listed below. With Filter Without $400 $50 $25 Gains to Erie $200 $180 $130 Fishermen Bird Watchers What is the socially optimal outcome? Select] If Erie Textiles has the legal right to dispose their waste into the river, and all three parties cannot communicate with each other, will Erie use a filter? 1 Select ] What is the lowest dollar amount Erie will accept to operate with a filter?

Suppose Erie Textiles can dispose of its waste "for free" by dumping it into a nearby river. While the firm benefits from dumping waste into the river, the waste reduces the fish and bird reproduction. This causes damage to local fishermen and bird watchers. At a cost, Erie Textiles can filter out the toxins, in which case local fishermen and bird watchers will not suffer any damage. The relevant gains (in thousands of dollars) and losses for the three parties are listed below. With Filter Without $400 $50 $25 Gains to Erie $200 $180 $130 Fishermen Bird Watchers What is the socially optimal outcome? Select] If Erie Textiles has the legal right to dispose their waste into the river, and all three parties cannot communicate with each other, will Erie use a filter? 1 Select ] What is the lowest dollar amount Erie will accept to operate with a filter?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Ex
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