Suppose a monopolist faces two markets with demand curves given by D1(p1) = 200 -p1 D2(p2) = 100 -2p2 Assume that the monopolist’s cost function is c(y) = y^2 1. What is the optimal prices for the monopolist if it can charge different prices in these markets? 2. What is the optimal price if the monopolist must charge the same price in each market? 3. How much total consumers’ surplus changes between the two separate prices and the same price cases?

Suppose a monopolist faces two markets with demand curves given by D1(p1) = 200 -p1 D2(p2) = 100 -2p2 Assume that the monopolist’s cost function is c(y) = y^2 1. What is the optimal prices for the monopolist if it can charge different prices in these markets? 2. What is the optimal price if the monopolist must charge the same price in each market? 3. How much total consumers’ surplus changes between the two separate prices and the same price cases?

Microeconomics: Principles & Policy

14th Edition

ISBN:9781337794992

Author:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow

Publisher:William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow

Chapter12: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3DQ

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Suppose a monopolist faces two markets with demand curves given by D1(p1) = 200 -p1 D2(p2) = 100 -2p2 Assume that the monopolist’s cost function is c(y) = y^2 1. What is the optimal prices for the monopolist if it can charge different prices in these markets? 2. What is the optimal price if the monopolist must charge the same price in each market? 3. How much total consumers’ surplus changes between the two separate prices and the same price cases? Please answer this correctly, quickly,and legibly. This is my third submission of the same question. The first one was wrong and unredeemable the second one was not legible.
Suppose a monopolist faces two markets with demand curves given by D1(p1) = 200 -p1 D2(p2) = 100 -2p2 Assume that the monopolist’s cost function is c(y) = y^2 1. What is the optimal prices for the monopolist if it can charge different prices in these markets? 2. What is the optimal price if the monopolist must charge the same price in each market? 3. How much total consumers’ surplus changes between the two separate prices and the same price cases? Can I please be assigned an actual expert? The previous four answers have been incorrect. The last several questions I have asked have been plagued by mediocrity and poor answers.
Suppose a monopolist faces two markets with demand curves given by D1(p1) = 200 -p1 D2(p2) = 100 -2p2 Assume that the monopolist’s cost function is c(y) = y^2 1. What is the optimal prices for the monopolist if it can charge different prices in these markets? 2. What is the optimal price if the monopolist must charge the same price in each market? 3. How much total consumers’ surplus changes between the two separate prices and the same price cases? This is my fourth submission. no part of any previous solution was remotely right. I need this answered quickly. Yall have spent several days getting this wrong.
Suppose a monopolist faces two markets withdemand curves given by D1(p1) = 200 − p1D2(p2) = 100 − 2p2Assume that the monopolist’s cost function is c(y) = y2 1. What is the optimal prices for the monopolist if it can charge different prices in these markets?2. What is the optimal price if the monopolist must charge the same price in each market?3. How much total consumers’ surplus changes between the two separate prices and the sameprice cases?
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A monopolist faces two markets with demand functions given by q1 = 120 − p1 q2 = 120 − 2p2 The monopolist has no fixed costs of production, and the marginal cost of production is $10. Suppose the monopolist charges the price $80 per unit of output. What is the market demand at this price? Suppose that the monopolist charges different prices per unit of output in the two markets. How much output is produced? What are the prices? What is the monopolist’s profit?
Consider two groups of consumers. In the first group, each consumer has the inverse demand function P = 50 – Q. In the second group, each consumer has the inverse demand function P = 30 – Q. There are 10 consumers in each group, or 20 consumers in all. Marginal cost is always zero. The monopolist wants to maximize profits by designing a two-part tariff that will apply to both groups. (1) After paying the tariff, how much consumer surplus remains to a member of Group I? Of Group II? (2) Suppose that Q is a normal good. Compare the consumer surplus remaining for a member of Group I to the surplus remaining for a member of Group II. How might two-part tariffs affect the equality of the income distribution?