Suppose 101 people vote in an election between 4 candidates using a modified Borda count. In this modified count, last place votes count as 1 point, 3rd place votes count as 2 points, and 2nd place votes count as 3 points. If we make 1st place votes worth enough points, we can force this election to satisfy the majority criterion. What is the smallest number of points that we could assign to 1st place votes in order to guarantee that the majority criterion is satisfied?

Suppose 101 people vote in an election between 4 candidates using a modified Borda count. In this modified count, last place votes count as 1 point, 3rd place votes count as 2 points, and 2nd place votes count as 3 points. If we make 1st place votes worth enough points, we can force this election to satisfy the majority criterion. What is the smallest number of points that we could assign to 1st place votes in order to guarantee that the majority criterion is satisfied?

Advanced Engineering Mathematics

10th Edition

ISBN:9780470458365

Author:Erwin Kreyszig

Publisher:Erwin Kreyszig

Chapter2: Second-order Linear Odes

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1RQ

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