simultaneously set prices (as in the Bertrand model); and if some firm sets than other firms, then all firms must match that price. Show that any price and monopoly price can be obtained as the play of a Nash equilibrium. CHALLENGING EXERCISES 9.17. NUMBER OF COMPETITORS. Consider an n firm homogeneous-good ol constant marginal cost, the same for all firms. Let 8 be the minimum val count factor such that it is possible to sustain monopoly prices in a collusi Show that is decreasing in n. Interpret the result. 9.18. Two MARKETS. Consider the model of multimarket contact Section 9.3. Determine the minimum value of the discount factor s optimal collusive solution is stable. 9.19. SECRET PRICE CUTS. This exercise formalizes the model of secret pr sented in Section 9.2.35 Suppose that all consumers are willing to pay u for neous) product sold by two duopolists. In each period, demand can be hig 1-a) or low (probability a). When demand is high, h = 1 units can be s
simultaneously set prices (as in the Bertrand model); and if some firm sets than other firms, then all firms must match that price. Show that any price and monopoly price can be obtained as the play of a Nash equilibrium. CHALLENGING EXERCISES 9.17. NUMBER OF COMPETITORS. Consider an n firm homogeneous-good ol constant marginal cost, the same for all firms. Let 8 be the minimum val count factor such that it is possible to sustain monopoly prices in a collusi Show that is decreasing in n. Interpret the result. 9.18. Two MARKETS. Consider the model of multimarket contact Section 9.3. Determine the minimum value of the discount factor s optimal collusive solution is stable. 9.19. SECRET PRICE CUTS. This exercise formalizes the model of secret pr sented in Section 9.2.35 Suppose that all consumers are willing to pay u for neous) product sold by two duopolists. In each period, demand can be hig 1-a) or low (probability a). When demand is high, h = 1 units can be s
Chapter15: Imperfect Competition
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 15.3P
Related questions
Question
9.17
![COLLUSION AND PRICE W
simultaneously set prices (as in the Bertrand model); and if some firm sets a lower price
than other firms, then all firms must match that price. Show that any price between cost
and monopoly price can be obtained as the play of a Nash equilibrium.
CHALLENGING EXERCISES
9.17. NUMBER OF COMPETITORS. Consider an n firm homogeneous-good oligopoly with
constant marginal cost, the same for all firms. Let 6 be the minimum value of the dis-
count factor such that it is possible to sustain monopoly prices in a collusive agreement.
Show that is decreasing in n. Interpret the result.
9.18. Two MARKETS. Consider the model of multimarket contact presented in
Section 9.3. Determine the minimum value of the discount factor such that the
optimal collusive solution is stable.
9.19. SECRET PRICE CUTS. This exercise formalizes the model of secret price cups pre-
sented in Section 9.2.35 Suppose that all consumers are willing to pay u for the (homoge-
neous) product sold by two duopolists. In each period, demand can be high (probability
1-a) or low (probability a). When demand is high, h = 1 units can be sold at price u](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fff6f9a4d-2084-42ea-abf6-3325fa2ca826%2Fcb8fb8d4-b304-45ba-b958-56a1e7444f8d%2F3sob4m_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:COLLUSION AND PRICE W
simultaneously set prices (as in the Bertrand model); and if some firm sets a lower price
than other firms, then all firms must match that price. Show that any price between cost
and monopoly price can be obtained as the play of a Nash equilibrium.
CHALLENGING EXERCISES
9.17. NUMBER OF COMPETITORS. Consider an n firm homogeneous-good oligopoly with
constant marginal cost, the same for all firms. Let 6 be the minimum value of the dis-
count factor such that it is possible to sustain monopoly prices in a collusive agreement.
Show that is decreasing in n. Interpret the result.
9.18. Two MARKETS. Consider the model of multimarket contact presented in
Section 9.3. Determine the minimum value of the discount factor such that the
optimal collusive solution is stable.
9.19. SECRET PRICE CUTS. This exercise formalizes the model of secret price cups pre-
sented in Section 9.2.35 Suppose that all consumers are willing to pay u for the (homoge-
neous) product sold by two duopolists. In each period, demand can be high (probability
1-a) or low (probability a). When demand is high, h = 1 units can be sold at price u
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