3) If you are the attacker, and you know that the defender is going to choose the best strategy they can to maximize the probability of preventing an attack, how should you choose your strategy to maximize the probability of a successful attack? {
3) If you are the attacker, and you know that the defender is going to choose the best strategy they can to maximize the probability of preventing an attack, how should you choose your strategy to maximize the probability of a successful attack? {
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Question
please send handwritten solution for Q3
![There are N sites that need protection (number them 1 to N). Someone is going to pick one of them to attack,
and you must pick one to protect. Suppose that the attacker is going to attack site i with probability q:. You plan
on selecting a site to protect, with probability pi of selecting site i. If you select the same site to protect that the
attacker chooses to attack, you successfully defend that site. The choice of {q;} and {p;} represent the attacker's
and defender's strategy, respectively.
1) What is the probability that you successfully prevent the attack, given strategies {4:}, {p:}?? .
2) If you knew {qı,...,qN} in advance, how should you choose {p:} to maximize the probability you successfully
prevent an attack?
3) If you are the attacker, and you know that the defender is going to choose the best strategy they can to maximize
the probability of preventing an attack, how should you choose your strategy to maximize the probability of a
successful attack? (
4) Questions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 address the probability of a successful defense from the perspective of the attacker
thinking about the best possible defender. Consider as well the perspective of the defender thinking about the
best possible attacker. Re-do 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 from this perspective, then argue what the 'final' strategies for each
player will be in this game.
In the questions that follow, we imagine that a successful attack on site i will cost the defender C;.
5) What is the expected or average cost of an attack, given strategies {4;}, {p:}? ( *](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Fb6ab8905-bacd-4cb2-8fa4-b31dc43beca2%2Ff1b74f23-458c-4929-890e-892adca1c421%2Fpk2prgvpf_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:There are N sites that need protection (number them 1 to N). Someone is going to pick one of them to attack,
and you must pick one to protect. Suppose that the attacker is going to attack site i with probability q:. You plan
on selecting a site to protect, with probability pi of selecting site i. If you select the same site to protect that the
attacker chooses to attack, you successfully defend that site. The choice of {q;} and {p;} represent the attacker's
and defender's strategy, respectively.
1) What is the probability that you successfully prevent the attack, given strategies {4:}, {p:}?? .
2) If you knew {qı,...,qN} in advance, how should you choose {p:} to maximize the probability you successfully
prevent an attack?
3) If you are the attacker, and you know that the defender is going to choose the best strategy they can to maximize
the probability of preventing an attack, how should you choose your strategy to maximize the probability of a
successful attack? (
4) Questions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 address the probability of a successful defense from the perspective of the attacker
thinking about the best possible defender. Consider as well the perspective of the defender thinking about the
best possible attacker. Re-do 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 from this perspective, then argue what the 'final' strategies for each
player will be in this game.
In the questions that follow, we imagine that a successful attack on site i will cost the defender C;.
5) What is the expected or average cost of an attack, given strategies {4;}, {p:}? ( *
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