Recall the setting from class. The firm Amazon wants to hire Lisbeth, a skilled programmer, by offering her a contract. A contract specifies a wage w and a minimum level of effort e that the worker must provide. Lisbeth does not have to accept the contract. If she does, she can exert high effort e = e or low

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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5 * Enter a number without quotes. Round to the first decimal if necessary. Do not use fractions. For decimal numbers between 0 and 1, use a 0 in front, i.e. write "0.5" instead of ".5".
Recall the setting from class. The firm Amazon wants to hire
Lisbeth, a skilled programmer, by offering her a contract. A
contract specifies a wage w and a minimum level of effort e that
the worker must provide. Lisbeth does not have to accept the
contract. If she does, she can exert high effort e = eH or low
effort e = e. Amazon can observe the level of effort and only
pays Lisbeth if she provides the level of effort required in the
contract.
Amazon's revenues are 5 if Lisbeth exerts effort eH, 1 if she
exerts effort eL, and O if she refuses the offer.
Lisbeth utility is wage - cost of effort: U = w -C(e) where the cost
of effort is C(eH) = 1 and C(eL) = 0.5.
Contrary to the class setting, suppose that if Lisbeth refuses
Amazon's contract, she can be hired by Facebook with a contract
(2, el), and Amazon knows this when making their offer.
First, what is the utility that Lisbeth would derive Facebook's
contract?
|(See note * at the bottom.)
Then, complete below what contract Amazon will offer Lisbeth:
W =
(See note * at the bottom.)
Required effort level e =
(Enter: H or L)
Transcribed Image Text:Recall the setting from class. The firm Amazon wants to hire Lisbeth, a skilled programmer, by offering her a contract. A contract specifies a wage w and a minimum level of effort e that the worker must provide. Lisbeth does not have to accept the contract. If she does, she can exert high effort e = eH or low effort e = e. Amazon can observe the level of effort and only pays Lisbeth if she provides the level of effort required in the contract. Amazon's revenues are 5 if Lisbeth exerts effort eH, 1 if she exerts effort eL, and O if she refuses the offer. Lisbeth utility is wage - cost of effort: U = w -C(e) where the cost of effort is C(eH) = 1 and C(eL) = 0.5. Contrary to the class setting, suppose that if Lisbeth refuses Amazon's contract, she can be hired by Facebook with a contract (2, el), and Amazon knows this when making their offer. First, what is the utility that Lisbeth would derive Facebook's contract? |(See note * at the bottom.) Then, complete below what contract Amazon will offer Lisbeth: W = (See note * at the bottom.) Required effort level e = (Enter: H or L)
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