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Question 4: Consider the following “modified" prisoners' dilemma: Defect Nuclear Соорerate 4, 4 Соорегate Defect 1, 5 0, 0 0, 0 5, 1 2, 2 Nuclear 0, 0 0, 0 0,0 (a) This is simply a Prisoners’ dilemma with a “nuclear option" added to the actions. Suppose this game is played once. Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. (b) Suppose this game is played three times repeatedly. Show that there is an equilibrium (SPE) where cooperation is sustained early in the game.

Question 4: Consider the following “modified" prisoners' dilemma: Defect Nuclear Соорerate 4, 4 Соорегate Defect 1, 5 0, 0 0, 0 5, 1 2, 2 Nuclear 0, 0 0, 0 0,0 (a) This is simply a Prisoners’ dilemma with a “nuclear option" added to the actions. Suppose this game is played once. Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. (b) Suppose this game is played three times repeatedly. Show that there is an equilibrium (SPE) where cooperation is sustained early in the game.

MATLAB: An Introduction with Applications
MATLAB: An Introduction with Applications
6th Edition
ISBN:9781119256830
Author:Amos Gilat
Publisher:Amos Gilat
Chapter1: Starting With Matlab
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1P
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Question 4: Consider the following "modified" prisoners' dilemma: Сооperate Defect Nuclear 0, 0 0, 0 0,0 1, 5 Соореrate Defect 4, 4 5, 1 2, 2 Nuclear 0,0 0, 0 (a) This is simply a Prisoners' dilemma with a "nuclear option" added to the actions. Suppose this game is played once. Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. (b) Suppose this game is played three times repeatedly. Show that there is an equilibrium (SPE) where cooperation is sustained early in the game.
Transcribed Image Text:Question 4: Consider the following "modified" prisoners' dilemma: Сооperate Defect Nuclear 0, 0 0, 0 0,0 1, 5 Соореrate Defect 4, 4 5, 1 2, 2 Nuclear 0,0 0, 0 (a) This is simply a Prisoners' dilemma with a "nuclear option" added to the actions. Suppose this game is played once. Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. (b) Suppose this game is played three times repeatedly. Show that there is an equilibrium (SPE) where cooperation is sustained early in the game.
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