Q4: For the following data, define, the mean, median and mode, and calculate the significant sample size for 95% confidence level with a margin of error equals to two Trial # Value 1 99 2 53 22 74 53 81 86 91 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 의미 11 12 24 13 14 15 28 58 60 42 46 32 38

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
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I need an answer to question 4 (image 2)

Q4:
For the following data, define, the mean, median and mode, and calculate the significant sample size for 95%
confidence level with a margin of error equals to two
Trial # Value
1
99
53
22
74
53
81
86
91
28
58
60
42
46
32
38
2
3
4
1010
5
6
7
8
9
10
OH
11
12
13
14
15
Transcribed Image Text:Q4: For the following data, define, the mean, median and mode, and calculate the significant sample size for 95% confidence level with a margin of error equals to two Trial # Value 1 99 53 22 74 53 81 86 91 28 58 60 42 46 32 38 2 3 4 1010 5 6 7 8 9 10 OH 11 12 13 14 15
Q1:
Find the Unique Nash Equilibrium for this game (i.e., either one pure N.E., or a mixed
strategy)
Player 1
Q2
You are assessing the behavior of the site workers to report safety hazards within the site.
Accordingly, you developed the following payoff matrix for two homogenous symmetric
workers that represents their actions, along with their payoffs. Each worker would like the
benefit of stopping the hazardous actions within the site, that will benefit him/her with 10
points. However, reporting it will cost the worker 3 points. If no one reported the
hazardous event, the worker will get zero points.
Find the Nash Equilibrium of this game that represents the percentage of workers that will
report the hazardous event.
Worker 1
B2(3)
B2 = 1
B2(4)
B2=B3 =
0.5
B1(3 B1-B2=0. B2-B3=0.
5
5
B1(4 B1-B3=0. B1-B2=B
3= 0.34
5
B1(2
Left
Up 1,0
Center -1,0
Down 0,2
Q3
Instead of the qualified least bidder awarding criteria, the Average Bid (AB) method awards the
contract to the bidder closest to the average of the submitted bids. The following table presents a
three-bidder game where bidders (B1, B2, and B3) are competing in an AB project. Their
simplified markups are shown in brackets, while the payoff for the zero-sum game is shown in the
table (note that the losing bid has a -1 payoff).
B2(5)
Report
Do nothing
Solve for the N.E. (Hint, you might need more than one approach to solve this game).
B3(4)
B3 (5)
B3(6)
B2(4)
B3 =1
Player 2
Middle Right
10,-1
0,1
-2,-2 -12,4
23,-1 2,0
B3=1
B1-B3=0.
5
Worker 2
Report Do Nothing
10,7
7,7
10,7
0,0
B2(3)
B2= 1
B1-B2=0.
5
Bl=1
B2=1
B2=1
B1-B2=0.
5
B2(5)
B2-B3=0.
5
B2=B3=0.
5
B2-B3=0.
5
B2(3)
B2=1
B1-B2=0.
5
Bl=1
B2(4)
B2=1
B2=1
B1-B2=0.
5
B2(5
B2=
1
B2=
1
B2=
1
Transcribed Image Text:Q1: Find the Unique Nash Equilibrium for this game (i.e., either one pure N.E., or a mixed strategy) Player 1 Q2 You are assessing the behavior of the site workers to report safety hazards within the site. Accordingly, you developed the following payoff matrix for two homogenous symmetric workers that represents their actions, along with their payoffs. Each worker would like the benefit of stopping the hazardous actions within the site, that will benefit him/her with 10 points. However, reporting it will cost the worker 3 points. If no one reported the hazardous event, the worker will get zero points. Find the Nash Equilibrium of this game that represents the percentage of workers that will report the hazardous event. Worker 1 B2(3) B2 = 1 B2(4) B2=B3 = 0.5 B1(3 B1-B2=0. B2-B3=0. 5 5 B1(4 B1-B3=0. B1-B2=B 3= 0.34 5 B1(2 Left Up 1,0 Center -1,0 Down 0,2 Q3 Instead of the qualified least bidder awarding criteria, the Average Bid (AB) method awards the contract to the bidder closest to the average of the submitted bids. The following table presents a three-bidder game where bidders (B1, B2, and B3) are competing in an AB project. Their simplified markups are shown in brackets, while the payoff for the zero-sum game is shown in the table (note that the losing bid has a -1 payoff). B2(5) Report Do nothing Solve for the N.E. (Hint, you might need more than one approach to solve this game). B3(4) B3 (5) B3(6) B2(4) B3 =1 Player 2 Middle Right 10,-1 0,1 -2,-2 -12,4 23,-1 2,0 B3=1 B1-B3=0. 5 Worker 2 Report Do Nothing 10,7 7,7 10,7 0,0 B2(3) B2= 1 B1-B2=0. 5 Bl=1 B2=1 B2=1 B1-B2=0. 5 B2(5) B2-B3=0. 5 B2=B3=0. 5 B2-B3=0. 5 B2(3) B2=1 B1-B2=0. 5 Bl=1 B2(4) B2=1 B2=1 B1-B2=0. 5 B2(5 B2= 1 B2= 1 B2= 1
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