Q3. Consider the following tw0-stage game: Stage 1: Player 1 moves first to choose either L or R. Stage 2: Player 2 can observe the action of Player 1; they then move simultaneously to choose A or B. The game is given in extensive form as: Stage 2 (10,10) (0,9) Stage 1 (9,0) (7,7) Player 1 (1,1) (0,2) (2,0) Player 1 (8,8) Player 2

Q3. Consider the following tw0-stage game: Stage 1: Player 1 moves first to choose either L or R. Stage 2: Player 2 can observe the action of Player 1; they then move simultaneously to choose A or B. The game is given in extensive form as: Stage 2 (10,10) (0,9) Stage 1 (9,0) (7,7) Player 1 (1,1) (0,2) (2,0) Player 1 (8,8) Player 2

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Player 2 E F H A 6, 5 6, 7 9, 6 7,6 В Player 1 C 6, 7 6, 9 8, 5 9, 7 5, 8 5, 6 7,5 7,5 7,9 8, 7 11, 6 5, 6 (1) In the Unique Nash equilibrium of this game, which strategy does Player1 play? And why? (2) In the Unique Nash equilibrium of this game, which strategy does Player2 play? And why? (3) Is this game dominance solvable? And Why? (4) Does this game have at least one inadmissible Nash equilibrium? And Why?
14 To make the best decisions in a sequential game, you must concentrate on only your objectives and ignore your rival's objectives. A False B. True
5) Consider the following simultaneously move game. Player 1\Player 2 Top Middle Bottom Find Nash equilibrium. Left 2,2 1,3 3,1 Center 0,0 3,0 2,3 Right 1,3 1,0 2,2
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5. Design and solve a one-period game with two players who each have two possible actions. Assume the players make their respective choices of actions simultaneously. Design your game so that there are three Nash equilibria (at least). After solving the Nash equilibria of the game, interpret your game in the context of corporate culture.
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What is the secure strategy for player B in the game presented in Table