Q2. The profit of the firm depends on effort of the agent e and a random component (economic conditions) e. The profit of the firm is π = e + 0.5€. The principal observes the profit, but does not know effort e. The only available information about economic shock for the principal is that E€ = 0. The principal maximizes his utility which is up (π, w) = E(T -w), where w is wage paid to the agent. The agent maximizes ua (w, e) = E(w) - c(e), where c(e) are costs of putting effort e. Suppose that c(e) = 0.5e². (a) Suppose that the principal observes effort. Design the first best contract. (b) Suppose now that effort is unobservable. Consider only linear contracts. Design the second best contract. Discuss the intuition of your results.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Q2. The profit of the firm depends on effort of the agent e and a random component (economic conditions) €. The profit of the firm is = e + 0.5€. The principal
observes the profit, but does not know effort e. The only available information about economic shock for the principal is that Ee = 0. The principal maximizes his utility
which is up (π, w) = E(T-w), where w is wage paid to the agent. The agent maximizes ua (w, e) = E(w) - c(e), where c(e) are costs of putting effort e. Suppose
that c(e) = 0.5e².
(a) Suppose that the principal observes effort. Design the first best contract.
(b) Suppose now that effort is unobservable. Consider only linear contracts. Design the second best contract. Discuss the intuition of your results.
Transcribed Image Text:Q2. The profit of the firm depends on effort of the agent e and a random component (economic conditions) €. The profit of the firm is = e + 0.5€. The principal observes the profit, but does not know effort e. The only available information about economic shock for the principal is that Ee = 0. The principal maximizes his utility which is up (π, w) = E(T-w), where w is wage paid to the agent. The agent maximizes ua (w, e) = E(w) - c(e), where c(e) are costs of putting effort e. Suppose that c(e) = 0.5e². (a) Suppose that the principal observes effort. Design the first best contract. (b) Suppose now that effort is unobservable. Consider only linear contracts. Design the second best contract. Discuss the intuition of your results.
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