Problem 3: (3+3+4 = 10 points) Let's look at a 2-player game where the players are A and B, and their actions are X, Y, and Z, with the following payoff matrix: B: X B: Y B: Z A: X 20,10 10, 20 1,1 A: Y 10, 20 20,10 1,1 A: Z 1,1 1,1 0,0 1) Reduce the payoff matrix using the Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS) technique. 2) Do pure strategy Nash equilibrium/equilibria exist? If yes, what is/are the strategy/strategies for both players? (Hint: you should work on the reduced matrix from the previous subquestion). 3) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and both players' expected payoff at the equilibrium (Hint: you should work on the reduced matrix from the previous subquestion).
Problem 3: (3+3+4 = 10 points) Let's look at a 2-player game where the players are A and B, and their actions are X, Y, and Z, with the following payoff matrix: B: X B: Y B: Z A: X 20,10 10, 20 1,1 A: Y 10, 20 20,10 1,1 A: Z 1,1 1,1 0,0 1) Reduce the payoff matrix using the Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS) technique. 2) Do pure strategy Nash equilibrium/equilibria exist? If yes, what is/are the strategy/strategies for both players? (Hint: you should work on the reduced matrix from the previous subquestion). 3) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and both players' expected payoff at the equilibrium (Hint: you should work on the reduced matrix from the previous subquestion).
MATLAB: An Introduction with Applications
6th Edition
ISBN:9781119256830
Author:Amos Gilat
Publisher:Amos Gilat
Chapter1: Starting With Matlab
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1P
Related questions
Question
![Problem 3: (3+3+4
=
10 points) Let's look at a 2-player game where the players are A and B, and
their actions are X, Y, and Z, with the following payoff matrix:
B: X
B: Y
B: Z
A: X
20,10
10, 20
1,1
A: Y
10, 20
20,10
1,1
A: Z
1,1
1,1
0,0
1) Reduce the payoff matrix using the Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS)
technique.
2) Do pure strategy Nash equilibrium/equilibria exist? If yes, what is/are the strategy/strategies for
both players? (Hint: you should work on the reduced matrix from the previous subquestion).
3) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and both players' expected payoff at the equilibrium
(Hint: you should work on the reduced matrix from the previous subquestion).](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F1cef52b5-d7de-4380-ac7a-ce3fa20a47c1%2F65779909-b9f4-408a-a1bd-4ae007ad43c2%2Fa45clhi_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Problem 3: (3+3+4
=
10 points) Let's look at a 2-player game where the players are A and B, and
their actions are X, Y, and Z, with the following payoff matrix:
B: X
B: Y
B: Z
A: X
20,10
10, 20
1,1
A: Y
10, 20
20,10
1,1
A: Z
1,1
1,1
0,0
1) Reduce the payoff matrix using the Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies (IESDS)
technique.
2) Do pure strategy Nash equilibrium/equilibria exist? If yes, what is/are the strategy/strategies for
both players? (Hint: you should work on the reduced matrix from the previous subquestion).
3) Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and both players' expected payoff at the equilibrium
(Hint: you should work on the reduced matrix from the previous subquestion).
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