Problem 2 Consider the following method of dissolving a partnership. Two partners each own one share of a firm. They have a dispute and each partner wishes to either buy-out, or be bought- out by the other partner. Partner i values both his own and his partner's share at 0; per share. Assume that the 0's are independently and uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Each partner knows his own but not his partner's. The mechanism that the partners agree upon is the following: Each partner bids for the other's share. The highest bidder wins and obtains her part- ner's share for the amount of her winning bid. In the event of a tie, each partner wins with equal probability. (a) Solve for a symmetric equilibrium bidding function in linear strategies, that is, of the form: Is such an equilibrium unique? b(0)=a+ße (b) Suppose the mechanism was modified as follows: The highest bidder wins the oppo- nent's share but pays the amount of the losing bid. Solve for a symmetric linear equi- librium b(.). Discuss whether b() exceeds, equals, or is less than b(); of course, this relationship may vary with 0.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Problem 2
Consider the following method of dissolving a partnership. Two partners each own one
share of a firm. They have a dispute and each partner wishes to either buy-out, or be bought-
out by the other partner. Partner i values both his own and his partner's share at 0; per share.
Assume that the 0;'s are independently and uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Each partner
knows his own 0 but not his partner's. The mechanism that the partners agree upon is the
following:
Each partner bids for the other's share. The highest bidder wins and obtains her part-
ner's share for the amount of her winning bid. In the event of a tie, each partner wins with
equal probability.
(a) Solve for a symmetric equilibrium bidding function in linear strategies, that is, of the
form:
b(0) = a+B0
Is such an equilibrium unique?
(b) Suppose the mechanism was modified as follows: The highest bidder wins the oppo-
nent's share but pays the amount of the losing bid. Solve for a symmetric linear equi-
librium b(-). Discuss whether b(-) exceeds, equals, or is less than b(-); of course, this
relationship may vary with 0.
Transcribed Image Text:Problem 2 Consider the following method of dissolving a partnership. Two partners each own one share of a firm. They have a dispute and each partner wishes to either buy-out, or be bought- out by the other partner. Partner i values both his own and his partner's share at 0; per share. Assume that the 0;'s are independently and uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Each partner knows his own 0 but not his partner's. The mechanism that the partners agree upon is the following: Each partner bids for the other's share. The highest bidder wins and obtains her part- ner's share for the amount of her winning bid. In the event of a tie, each partner wins with equal probability. (a) Solve for a symmetric equilibrium bidding function in linear strategies, that is, of the form: b(0) = a+B0 Is such an equilibrium unique? (b) Suppose the mechanism was modified as follows: The highest bidder wins the oppo- nent's share but pays the amount of the losing bid. Solve for a symmetric linear equi- librium b(-). Discuss whether b(-) exceeds, equals, or is less than b(-); of course, this relationship may vary with 0.
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