PROBLEM (1) Firms 1 and 2 have total cost functions TC₁(q) = q² and TC₂ (q) = ²/3 (with MC₁(q) = 2q and MC₂ (q) =) respectively. They are competing in quantities in a market with (inverse) demand p = 630 - 20. Determine the market price in each of the following market organization scenarios: (a) [C] Cournot-Nash equilibrium They are competing in Cournot competition. (b) [S] Stackelberg Equilibrium As in (a), but A is the leader and chooses the quantity first (and B chooses her quantity afterwards, observing A's choice). (c) [M] Collusion They collude as in a cartel, to maximize joint profits.
PROBLEM (1) Firms 1 and 2 have total cost functions TC₁(q) = q² and TC₂ (q) = ²/3 (with MC₁(q) = 2q and MC₂ (q) =) respectively. They are competing in quantities in a market with (inverse) demand p = 630 - 20. Determine the market price in each of the following market organization scenarios: (a) [C] Cournot-Nash equilibrium They are competing in Cournot competition. (b) [S] Stackelberg Equilibrium As in (a), but A is the leader and chooses the quantity first (and B chooses her quantity afterwards, observing A's choice). (c) [M] Collusion They collude as in a cartel, to maximize joint profits.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
Please answer all parts and do not use ChatGPT or other
![## Problem (1)
Firms 1 and 2 have total cost functions \( TC_1(q) = q^2 \) and \( TC_2(q) = \frac{q^2}{3} \) (with \( MC_1(q) = 2q \) and \( MC_2(q) = \frac{2q}{3} \) respectively). They are competing in quantities in a market with (inverse) demand \( p = 630 - 2Q \).
Determine the market price in each of the following market organization scenarios:
**(a) [C] Cournot-Nash Equilibrium**
- They are competing in Cournot competition.
**(b) [S] Stackelberg Equilibrium**
- As in (a), but A is the leader and chooses the quantity first (and B chooses her quantity afterwards, observing A’s choice).
**(c) [M] Collusion**
- They collude as in a cartel, to maximize joint profits.
**(d) [P] Perfect Competition Benchmark**
- They behave perfectly competitively, as price takers.
**(e) Calculate the DWL (dead-weight loss, inefficiency) in the Stackelberg equilibrium in (b).**
- (WARNING: tedious calculations!)
**(f) (MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION: NO calculation/explanation needed!)** Which of the following 6 market arrangements below …
(i) Firm 1 operates as a monopoly (Firm 2 doesn’t exist at all)
(ii) Firm 1 operates as a perfectly competitive firm (as a price taker!) (Firm 2 doesn’t exist at all)
(iii) Firm 2 operates as a monopoly (Firm 1 doesn’t exist at all)
(iv) Firm 2 operates as a perfectly competitive firm (as a price taker!) (Firm 1 doesn’t exist at all)
(v) Firm 1 and Firm 2 collude (Scenario (c) above)
(vi) Firm 1 and Firm 2 operate as perfectly competitive firms as price takers (Scenario (d) above)
**Which scenario maximizes Total Surplus (TS)?** [ ]
**Which scenario maximizes Producer Surplus (PS)?** [ ]
**Which scenario minimizes Consumer Surplus (CS)?** [ ]](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F5561c192-84bc-413b-a753-73e7dd031905%2Fbae6b698-1f98-40f7-9e74-58828291d0b7%2Fn5dxph_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:## Problem (1)
Firms 1 and 2 have total cost functions \( TC_1(q) = q^2 \) and \( TC_2(q) = \frac{q^2}{3} \) (with \( MC_1(q) = 2q \) and \( MC_2(q) = \frac{2q}{3} \) respectively). They are competing in quantities in a market with (inverse) demand \( p = 630 - 2Q \).
Determine the market price in each of the following market organization scenarios:
**(a) [C] Cournot-Nash Equilibrium**
- They are competing in Cournot competition.
**(b) [S] Stackelberg Equilibrium**
- As in (a), but A is the leader and chooses the quantity first (and B chooses her quantity afterwards, observing A’s choice).
**(c) [M] Collusion**
- They collude as in a cartel, to maximize joint profits.
**(d) [P] Perfect Competition Benchmark**
- They behave perfectly competitively, as price takers.
**(e) Calculate the DWL (dead-weight loss, inefficiency) in the Stackelberg equilibrium in (b).**
- (WARNING: tedious calculations!)
**(f) (MULTIPLE CHOICE QUESTION: NO calculation/explanation needed!)** Which of the following 6 market arrangements below …
(i) Firm 1 operates as a monopoly (Firm 2 doesn’t exist at all)
(ii) Firm 1 operates as a perfectly competitive firm (as a price taker!) (Firm 2 doesn’t exist at all)
(iii) Firm 2 operates as a monopoly (Firm 1 doesn’t exist at all)
(iv) Firm 2 operates as a perfectly competitive firm (as a price taker!) (Firm 1 doesn’t exist at all)
(v) Firm 1 and Firm 2 collude (Scenario (c) above)
(vi) Firm 1 and Firm 2 operate as perfectly competitive firms as price takers (Scenario (d) above)
**Which scenario maximizes Total Surplus (TS)?** [ ]
**Which scenario maximizes Producer Surplus (PS)?** [ ]
**Which scenario minimizes Consumer Surplus (CS)?** [ ]
Expert Solution

This question has been solved!
Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.
This is a popular solution!
Trending now
This is a popular solution!
Step by step
Solved in 5 steps

Knowledge Booster
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.Recommended textbooks for you


Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON


Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education