Player 2 Strategy A 32, 32 4, -25 Player 1 B -25, 4 40, 40 a. Determine the Nash equlibrlum outcomes that arise if the players make decisions Independently, simultaneously, and without i communication. Instructions: In order to recelve full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to place a check mark. For Incorrect answer(s). click twice to empty the box. (40, 40) O32, 32) O (4. -25) O-25. 4) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? ) (40, 40) O (4. -25) O (-25, 4) O (32, 32) b. Suppose player 1 Is permitted to "communicate" by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and Independently their decisions. What should player 1 utter? OA OB What outcome do you think would occur as a result? O (32, 32) O (-25, 4) O (4, -25) O (40, 40) c. Suppose player 2 can choose Its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2's cholce before making her decision, that this move structure Is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? O (32, 32)
Player 2 Strategy A 32, 32 4, -25 Player 1 B -25, 4 40, 40 a. Determine the Nash equlibrlum outcomes that arise if the players make decisions Independently, simultaneously, and without i communication. Instructions: In order to recelve full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to place a check mark. For Incorrect answer(s). click twice to empty the box. (40, 40) O32, 32) O (4. -25) O-25. 4) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? ) (40, 40) O (4. -25) O (-25, 4) O (32, 32) b. Suppose player 1 Is permitted to "communicate" by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and Independently their decisions. What should player 1 utter? OA OB What outcome do you think would occur as a result? O (32, 32) O (-25, 4) O (4, -25) O (40, 40) c. Suppose player 2 can choose Its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2's cholce before making her decision, that this move structure Is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? O (32, 32)
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
1

Transcribed Image Text:Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions.
Player 2
Strategy
Y
32, 32
4, -25
Player 1
B
–25, 4
40, 40
a. Determine the Nash equilibrlum outcomes that arlse if the players make decisions Independently, simultaneously, and without any
communication.
Instructions: In order to recelve full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to
place a check mark. For Incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box.
| (40, 40)
O (32, 32)
O (4. -25)
O-25. 4)
Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely?
) (40, 40)
O (4. -25)
O (-25, 4)
O (32, 32)
b. Suppose player 1 Is permitted to "communicate" by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and Independently make
their decisions. What should player 1 utter?
O A
OB
What outcome do you think would occur as a result?
O (32, 32)
O (-25, 4)
O (4. -25)
O (40, 40)
c. Suppose player 2 can choose Its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2's cholce before making her decislon, and
that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect?
O (32, 32)
O (-25, 4)
O (4. -25)
O (40, 40)
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