Planet Earth is protected by the Justice League, and only the Justice League. Demand for earth saving events is represented by P-100-Q, which means the Marginal Revenue for the Justice League is MR=100-2Q. However, superheroes don't run cheap, and each extra earth saving event costs more money, with the marginal cost curve being represented by MC-10+Q. Assume the Justice League's total costs can be represented by TC-100+10Q+0.5Q². a. What are the Justice League's average total costs? What are the Justice League's average variable costs? (I am looking for the equations) b. Draw the demand curve, the marginal revenue curve, the marginal cost curve, and the average total cost curve. Be sure to label all axes, curves, and intercepts. (Hint: graph ATC at Q=1, at the profit maximizing Q, and at a Q higher than the profit maximizing Q) c. What quantity of earth saving events will be provided, and what will the price be? Label them QM and PM on your graph. d. What will the Justice League's profit be? Label their profits on your graph. e. What will the Justice League's producer surplus be? Label their producer surplus on your graph. Now suppose an interplanetary agency, the Avengers, comes to planet Earth to offer its earth saving services. The Avengers and the Justice League have a choice to make: they can fight each other or live in peace. Ifone chooses to fight while the other chooses to live in peace, then the fighter will get all of the earth saving events. If they both choose to fight, then the Avengers will win, but at a large cost. Below is the payoff matrix The Avengers Peace Fight Реасе 50,50 08'0 10,30 Justice League Fight 40,0 f. What is/are the Nash Equilibrium (equilibria) outcome(s)? (hint: we are looking for the strategies, not the payoffs) g. Now assume they have a third choice, they can team up and become the Avengers of Justice! The new payoff matrix accounting for this option is below. What is/are the Nash Equilibrium (equilibria) outcome(s)? The Avengers Peace Fight Team Up Peace 50,50 Justice League Fight 40,0 10,30 40,0 Team Up 0,40 50,50 0'0

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
icon
Related questions
Question
This is for my homework and have been struggling with this all day
+
* C0
Planet Earth is protected by the Justice League, and only the Justice League. Demand for earth saving events is represented by P-100-Q, which means the
Marginal Revenue for the Justice League is MR=100-2Q. However, superheroes don't run cheap, and each extra earth saving event costs more money, with the
marginal cost curve being represented by MC=10+Q. Assume the Justice League's total costs can be represented by TC=100+10Q+0.5Q².
a. What are the Justice League's average total costs? What are the Justice League's average variable costs? (I am looking for the equations)
b. Draw the demand curve, the marginal revenue curve, the marginal cost curve, and the average total cost curve. Be sure to label all axes, curves, and
intercepts. (Hint: graph ATC at Q=1, at the profit maximizing Q, and at a Q higher than the profit maximizing Q)
c. What quantity of earth saving events will be provided, and what will the price be? Label them QM and PM on your graph.
d. What will the Justice League's profit be? Label their profits on your graph.
e. What will the Justice League's producer surplus be? Label their producer surplus on your graph.
Now suppose an interplanetary agency, the Avengers, comes to planet Earth to offer its earth saving services. The Avengers and the Justice League have a choice
to make: they can fight each other or live in peace. Itone chooses to fight while the other chooses to live in peace, then the fighter will get all of the earth saving
events. If they both choose to fight, then the Avengers will win, but at a large cost. Below is the payoff matrix
The Avengers
Peace
Fight
Justice League
Peace
50,50
08'0
10,30
Fight
f. What is/are the Nash Equilibrium (equilibria) outcome(s)? (hint: we are looking for the strategies, not the payoffs)
g. Now assume they have a third choice, they can team up and become the Avengers of Justice! The new payoff matrix accounting for this option is below.
What is/are the Nash Equilibrium (equilibria) outcome(s)?
The Avengers
Team Up
50,50
0,80
Justice
League
Fight
10,30
40,0
Team Up
0,40
50,50
oʻ0
>
MacBook Air
08
F3
of
DD
23
F6
F7
F8
F10
F11
F12
64
%23
2$
%3D
delete
3.
4.
5.
9
8.
6
Transcribed Image Text:+ * C0 Planet Earth is protected by the Justice League, and only the Justice League. Demand for earth saving events is represented by P-100-Q, which means the Marginal Revenue for the Justice League is MR=100-2Q. However, superheroes don't run cheap, and each extra earth saving event costs more money, with the marginal cost curve being represented by MC=10+Q. Assume the Justice League's total costs can be represented by TC=100+10Q+0.5Q². a. What are the Justice League's average total costs? What are the Justice League's average variable costs? (I am looking for the equations) b. Draw the demand curve, the marginal revenue curve, the marginal cost curve, and the average total cost curve. Be sure to label all axes, curves, and intercepts. (Hint: graph ATC at Q=1, at the profit maximizing Q, and at a Q higher than the profit maximizing Q) c. What quantity of earth saving events will be provided, and what will the price be? Label them QM and PM on your graph. d. What will the Justice League's profit be? Label their profits on your graph. e. What will the Justice League's producer surplus be? Label their producer surplus on your graph. Now suppose an interplanetary agency, the Avengers, comes to planet Earth to offer its earth saving services. The Avengers and the Justice League have a choice to make: they can fight each other or live in peace. Itone chooses to fight while the other chooses to live in peace, then the fighter will get all of the earth saving events. If they both choose to fight, then the Avengers will win, but at a large cost. Below is the payoff matrix The Avengers Peace Fight Justice League Peace 50,50 08'0 10,30 Fight f. What is/are the Nash Equilibrium (equilibria) outcome(s)? (hint: we are looking for the strategies, not the payoffs) g. Now assume they have a third choice, they can team up and become the Avengers of Justice! The new payoff matrix accounting for this option is below. What is/are the Nash Equilibrium (equilibria) outcome(s)? The Avengers Team Up 50,50 0,80 Justice League Fight 10,30 40,0 Team Up 0,40 50,50 oʻ0 > MacBook Air 08 F3 of DD 23 F6 F7 F8 F10 F11 F12 64 %23 2$ %3D delete 3. 4. 5. 9 8. 6
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 3 steps

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Property Rights, Bargaining And The Coase Theorem
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Recommended textbooks for you
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economics
ISBN:
9780190931919
Author:
NEWNAN
Publisher:
Oxford University Press
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education