Part 2: First Long Question There are two French bakeries in a small town: Le Meilleur Croissant (C), owned by Camille, and Le Meilleur Pain Au Chocolat (P), owned by Paul. In each period of an infınitely repeated game, they compete a la Bertrand, with market demand given by Q(pmin) = 10 - pmin: Even though they sell %3D identical goods, they have different marginal costs: cc = 2 and %3D
Part 2: First Long Question There are two French bakeries in a small town: Le Meilleur Croissant (C), owned by Camille, and Le Meilleur Pain Au Chocolat (P), owned by Paul. In each period of an infınitely repeated game, they compete a la Bertrand, with market demand given by Q(pmin) = 10 - pmin: Even though they sell %3D identical goods, they have different marginal costs: cc = 2 and %3D
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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
Transcribed Image Text:Part 2: First Long Question
There are two French bakeries in a small town: Le Meilleur
Croissant (C), owned by Camille, and Le Meilleur Pain Au
Chocolat (P), owned by Paul. In each period of an infinitely
repeated game, they compete a la Bertrand, with market
demand given by Q(pmin) = 10 - Pmin- Even though they sell
identical goods, they have different marginal costs: cc = 2 and
Cp = 4 (Paul bakes just as well but is bad at business
decisions). There are no fixed costs.

Transcribed Image Text:Now suppose that they separate. There is no more love.
Assume each firm operates completely independently and
there is no collusion. What is the equilibrium price in the
market?
Pmin - 6.5
Pmin
= 2
Pmin
= 6
Pmin
= 4
O Pmin
Expert Solution

Step 1
As the two bakeries are now in a Bertrand price competition , both Bakeries aim to capture major market share . This game leads both players to undercut their prices sequentially to grab major market share .
Now , in this game both players can undercut prices till the point its equal to their marginal costs as beyond that it would not be profitable to produce .
It is given ,
MC of Paul = 4 , MC of Camille = 2
For above game Camille can undercut its prices till the point its just slightly lesser than 4 , and grab all of the market . This is because at price slightly below 4 will make Paul to stop production and leave market .
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
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