I want the solution from part D to F. Please help explain. The questions are cummlative from A through to F. Consi der Hhe fallowing» The inverse femand function is givan by p= 30-@Cournet medel.where Q = E,+* Firm 13 marginal cost is $6lei=6). Fivm 2 uses a nemtechaulagyThere is nothat it's marginal cost is $3 (6=3).fixed cortSoThe fwo fims chooce thairand Compete onlyJame).Answer the follming puestions.O Derive Firm 1 amd Firm 2% vation furtions reupertivaly.o Solve Hhe Harh equilibrium ( ", q")O What is He equilibrinmlevel for eah firm.quenti tias simultaneculy(So it's aone- shot simultaneausonceprice and what is Hhe profitSuppore there isIim 2. Wlhat is the highert price that Firm I iswilling to paj for this newo Mow let's chauge the setup from Coumet campetitionto Bertrand Competitin, while maintaining all eftheraJAump tins. What is He equilibium price?O Suppon the fwe finms engage in Betrand (ompetitionWhat is the hijhut price that Fim 1 o millingfor He new feihnly?* market for the teihue lagy uped byto

Answered: O Consi der Hhe following » The inverse…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

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ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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I want the solution from part D to F. Please help explain. The questions are cummlative from A through to F.

Consi der Hhe fallowing
» The inverse femand function is givan by p= 30-@
Cournet medel.
where Q = E,+
* Firm 13 marginal cost is $6lei=6). Fivm 2 uses a nem
techaulagy
There is no
that it's marginal cost is $3 (6=3).
fixed cort
So
The fwo fims chooce thair
and Compete only
Jame).
Answer the follming puestions.
O Derive Firm 1 amd Firm 2% vation furtions reupertivaly.
o Solve Hhe Harh equilibrium ( ", q")
O What is He equilibrinm
level for eah firm.
quenti tias simultaneculy
(So it's a
one- shot simultaneaus
once
price and what is Hhe profit
Suppore there is
Iim 2. Wlhat is the highert price that Firm I is
willing to paj for this new
o Mow let's chauge the setup from Coumet campetition
to Bertrand Competitin, while maintaining all efther
aJAump tins. What is He equilibium price?
O Suppon the fwe finms engage in Betrand (ompetition
What is the hijhut price that Fim 1 o milling
for He new feihnly?
* market for the teihue lagy uped by
to

Expert Solution

Step 1

In the Cournot model, businesses compete on the amount of output they will generate, which they choose simultaneously and independently of one another.

In the Bertrand model, competing businesses decided on a price to sell their goods at simultaneously and independently.

The quantity that will be supplied at this price will then be determined by the market demand.

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