Nash equilibrium

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
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Consider Akerlof's adverse selection model with three-types of workers,
low, medium and high productivity. A worker of each type can produce a value
to firms equal to 1, 3 and 5, respectively. The fraction of workers of each
type is the same (one third), and hence the average productivity of workers
is 3. Workers differ not only in their productivity but also in their reservation
wage. In particular, the reservation wages of low, medium, and high productivity
workers are 0, 2+a, and 2+b, respectively, where a, b are exogenous parameters
that satisfy b > a > 0. Think of these reservation wages as the disutility
associated to being employed. Thus, the payoff of an employed worker is equal
to the wage minus their reservation wage, and zero if unemployed. There are
two identical firms that are unable to distinguish between different worker types.
However, individual workers do know their own productivity. The distribution
of worker types, productivities and associated reservation wages are common
knowledge.
1. Consider the first best. That is, consider a social planner that is able
to distinguish between different worker types, can assign workers to either to
employment or unemployment, and aims at maximizing total surplus. Find
conditions on parameter values, a, b, such that all types should be employed in
the first best.
2. Now consider the following game. In the first stage, the two firms, 1 and
2, simultaneously set wages w1, w2. In the second stage, workers choose which
offer to accept if any. Find conditions on parameter values, a, b, such that in
the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium only low types are employed.
Transcribed Image Text:Consider Akerlof's adverse selection model with three-types of workers, low, medium and high productivity. A worker of each type can produce a value to firms equal to 1, 3 and 5, respectively. The fraction of workers of each type is the same (one third), and hence the average productivity of workers is 3. Workers differ not only in their productivity but also in their reservation wage. In particular, the reservation wages of low, medium, and high productivity workers are 0, 2+a, and 2+b, respectively, where a, b are exogenous parameters that satisfy b > a > 0. Think of these reservation wages as the disutility associated to being employed. Thus, the payoff of an employed worker is equal to the wage minus their reservation wage, and zero if unemployed. There are two identical firms that are unable to distinguish between different worker types. However, individual workers do know their own productivity. The distribution of worker types, productivities and associated reservation wages are common knowledge. 1. Consider the first best. That is, consider a social planner that is able to distinguish between different worker types, can assign workers to either to employment or unemployment, and aims at maximizing total surplus. Find conditions on parameter values, a, b, such that all types should be employed in the first best. 2. Now consider the following game. In the first stage, the two firms, 1 and 2, simultaneously set wages w1, w2. In the second stage, workers choose which offer to accept if any. Find conditions on parameter values, a, b, such that in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium only low types are employed.
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