Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.20 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.)
Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.20 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.)
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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![Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm
oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals
$0.20 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals
average total cost (ATC) for each firm.
Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly.
(Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two
companies must equally share the output.)
Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-
maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work
together.
PRICE (Dollars per can
1.00
0.00
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0
Demand
MC ATC
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
QUANTITY (Thousands of cans of beer)
Monopoly Outcome
cans
When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce
and charge
per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of
, so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is
Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though
this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel
and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that
maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion
and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set
under the collusive agreement.
Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to
per can. Mays's profit is now
to
is now
Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit
Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity.
while McCovey's profit
when](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F3b58c3ed-bac2-42a1-9f10-64c9ea71e8d3%2F0f6746b1-167c-4bab-acfc-4ecfdcc43dd9%2Fao5xe_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Mays and McCovey are beer-brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm
oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals
$0.20 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals
average total cost (ATC) for each firm.
Suppose that Mays and McCovey form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly.
(Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two
companies must equally share the output.)
Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-
maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Mays and McCovey choose to work
together.
PRICE (Dollars per can
1.00
0.00
0.80
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0
Demand
MC ATC
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400
QUANTITY (Thousands of cans of beer)
Monopoly Outcome
cans
When they act as a profit-maximizing cartel, each company will produce
and charge
per can. Given this information, each firm earns a daily profit of
, so the daily total industry profit in the beer market is
Oligopolists often behave noncooperatively and act in their own self-interest even though
this decreases total profit in the market. Again, assume the two companies form a cartel
and decide to work together. Both firms initially agree to produce half the quantity that
maximizes total industry profit. Now, suppose that Mays decides to break the collusion
and increase its output by 50%, while McCovey continues to produce the amount set
under the collusive agreement.
Mays's deviation from the collusive agreement causes the price of a can of beer to
per can. Mays's profit is now
to
is now
Therefore, you can conclude that total industry profit
Mays increases its output beyond the collusive quantity.
while McCovey's profit
when
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