Let's consider an k-firm repeated game over an infinite discrete-time horizon t = 0, 1, ... with discount factor o≤ 1. The goods that firms produce are perfect substitutes. Firms are in Bertrand competition. Each firm has constant marginal cost m. The demand at time t is q(t)= D(pt), where ẞ is an expectation of future expansion or contraction and ẞ8 < 1. (i) ẞ and k are fixed, for what values of 8 is full collusion at the monopoly price a sustainable equilibrium of the repeated game? (ii) How does the ease of sustaining collusion change as the rate of expansion or contraction of the industry changes?
Let's consider an k-firm repeated game over an infinite discrete-time horizon t = 0, 1, ... with discount factor o≤ 1. The goods that firms produce are perfect substitutes. Firms are in Bertrand competition. Each firm has constant marginal cost m. The demand at time t is q(t)= D(pt), where ẞ is an expectation of future expansion or contraction and ẞ8 < 1. (i) ẞ and k are fixed, for what values of 8 is full collusion at the monopoly price a sustainable equilibrium of the repeated game? (ii) How does the ease of sustaining collusion change as the rate of expansion or contraction of the industry changes?
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
Please with a full explanation.
![Let's consider an k-firm repeated game over an infinite discrete-time
horizon t = 0, 1, .. with discount factor os 1. The goods that firms
produce are perfect substitutes. Firms are in Bertrand competition.
Each firm has constant marginal cost m. The demand at time t is
q(t)=6'D(pt), where B is an expectation of future expansion or
contraction and B8 < 1.
B and k are fixed , for what values of 8 is full collusion at the
(i)
monopoly price a sustainable equilibrium of the repeated game?
(ii)
How does the ease of sustaining collusion change as the rate
of expansion or contraction of the industry changes?](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F48998a8f-2749-400e-9f10-ccbd90964463%2Ff5e311a5-1e66-4902-9fc1-250e092853f2%2Fy1ycggt_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Let's consider an k-firm repeated game over an infinite discrete-time
horizon t = 0, 1, .. with discount factor os 1. The goods that firms
produce are perfect substitutes. Firms are in Bertrand competition.
Each firm has constant marginal cost m. The demand at time t is
q(t)=6'D(pt), where B is an expectation of future expansion or
contraction and B8 < 1.
B and k are fixed , for what values of 8 is full collusion at the
(i)
monopoly price a sustainable equilibrium of the repeated game?
(ii)
How does the ease of sustaining collusion change as the rate
of expansion or contraction of the industry changes?
Expert Solution
![](/static/compass_v2/shared-icons/check-mark.png)
This question has been solved!
Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.
Step by step
Solved in 4 steps with 3 images
![Blurred answer](/static/compass_v2/solution-images/blurred-answer.jpg)
Knowledge Booster
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.Recommended textbooks for you
![ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS](https://compass-isbn-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/isbn_cover_images/9780190931919/9780190931919_smallCoverImage.gif)
![Principles of Economics (12th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134078779/9780134078779_smallCoverImage.gif)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
![Engineering Economy (17th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134870069/9780134870069_smallCoverImage.gif)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
![ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS](https://compass-isbn-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/isbn_cover_images/9780190931919/9780190931919_smallCoverImage.gif)
![Principles of Economics (12th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134078779/9780134078779_smallCoverImage.gif)
Principles of Economics (12th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134078779
Author:
Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster
Publisher:
PEARSON
![Engineering Economy (17th Edition)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9780134870069/9780134870069_smallCoverImage.gif)
Engineering Economy (17th Edition)
Economics
ISBN:
9780134870069
Author:
William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling
Publisher:
PEARSON
![Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781305585126/9781305585126_smallCoverImage.gif)
Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)
Economics
ISBN:
9781305585126
Author:
N. Gregory Mankiw
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
![Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781337106665/9781337106665_smallCoverImage.gif)
Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
Economics
ISBN:
9781337106665
Author:
Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:
Cengage Learning
![Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…](https://www.bartleby.com/isbn_cover_images/9781259290619/9781259290619_smallCoverImage.gif)
Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…
Economics
ISBN:
9781259290619
Author:
Michael Baye, Jeff Prince
Publisher:
McGraw-Hill Education