Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p= 200 - 2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $40, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. What membership fee would maximize profit for the Club? The manager could have charged Joe a single price per round. How much extra profit does the Club earn by using two-part pricing? The profit-maximizing membership fee (F) is $ 6400. (Enter your response as a whole number.) The Club's extra profit (above what its profit would have been from charging a single per-round price) is $ (Enter your response as a whole number.)

Joe has just moved to a small town with only one golf course, the Northlands Golf Club. His inverse demand function is p= 200 - 2q, where q is the number of rounds of golf that he plays per year. The manager of the Northlands Club negotiates separately with each person who joins the club and can therefore charge individual prices. This manager has a good idea of what Joe's demand curve is and offers Joe a special deal, where Joe pays an annual membership fee and can play as many rounds as he wants at $40, which is the marginal cost his round imposes on the Club. What membership fee would maximize profit for the Club? The manager could have charged Joe a single price per round. How much extra profit does the Club earn by using two-part pricing? The profit-maximizing membership fee (F) is $ 6400. (Enter your response as a whole number.) The Club's extra profit (above what its profit would have been from charging a single per-round price) is $ (Enter your response as a whole number.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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