It was a clear case of structural failure. It was critical to understand exactly what had happened. The incident raised many questions; it was not just that the walkway fell or even that a miscalculation was evidently made, but also how every contributing factor came to exist and why errors were not caught earlier. The disaster in Kansas City occurred due to a connection that was overloaded because of an ill-advised change to a badly defined structural detail. The design failed to meet the requirements of the Kansas City Building Code. Checking the calculations at the design stage could have prevented this disaster. Investigations reveal that neither the designers nor the builders assumed responsibility for the final product. The design review process was ineffective. The accident was caused by relying on a longitudinal weld that wasn’t strong enough. For the engineering profession, the walkway collapse tragedy became a classic model in studying engineering ethics and errors. The American Society of Civil Engineers established the precedent that responsibility for the building lies with the engineer’s seal, referring to whoever sets their seal of approval on a set of plans. A city engineer, moreover, must do a formal check on load-bearing calculations. In this way, potential failures would be caught at the design stage and not after an accident takes place. Further investigations revealed that the original design that was given by structural engineer Jake D. Gillum required continuous suspension rods approximately 40-feet long. The steel fabricator Havens determined that these would be unacceptably expensive to procure and install. Therefore, he changed the design. The original design sized the suspension rods such that they were strong enough to support only 60% of the imposed load, based on code-allowable stresses. It is obvious that the use of the originally suggested suspension rods may have prevented the tragedy. Several participants in the design-construction process claimed to have told Gillum over the phone about the concerns they had about the safety of the proposed change, including the construction detailer WRW, the steel fabricator Havens, the architect PBNDML, and a technician. Gillum denies having received any such telephone calls. Havens submitted over 40 steel fabrication drawings to Gillum for review, including the one with the fatal change. Gillum reviewed, stamped, and approved the drawings. He did not look at the proposed change of design and its implications. In this case, the suspension rod walkway deck connection was not a standard connection, as detailed by the structural engineer Gillum on his own working drawings but he approved the design change anyway. The Missouri registration board called it a case of gross negligence, misconduct, unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering and canceled the Missouri professional engineering registration of all engineers involved in the case. An issue was raised to the effect that the Kansas City building department was said to be overworked and did not adequately check the structural drawings and calculations, or they might have discovered the fatal defect. The one positive outcome of this event was a heightened awareness nationwide of the importance of the building department’s plan checking activity. This generally resulted in better funding and more rigorous checking of plans in building departments throughout the country. The owners of the Hyatt-Regency Hotel paid over $140 million in damages to victims. The Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers, and Land Surveyors convicted engineers employed by Jack D. Gillum and Associates who had approved the final drawings of gross negligence, misconduct, and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. All of them lost their engineering licenses in Missouri and Texas, as well as their American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) memberships. Jack D. Gillum and Associates, for its part, lost its license to be an engineering firm, but Jack Gillum himself continued to take speaking engagements at engineering conferences so that others might learn from his mistakes. The hotel was rebuilt, and it still stands today, though it has changed many names in the intervening years. Instead of suspended walkways, the lobby was rebuilt with a single crossing on the second floor supported by large pillars, resulting in structurally sound construction. What lesson did the authorities learn from this incident? State any two actions that the team could have taken to prevent the failure? (Name and describe the actions in about 250 words)
It was a clear case of structural failure. It was critical to understand exactly what had happened. The incident raised many questions; it was not just that the walkway fell or even that a miscalculation was evidently made, but also how every contributing factor came to exist and why errors were not caught earlier.
The disaster in Kansas City occurred due to a connection that was overloaded because of an ill-advised change to a badly defined structural detail. The design failed to meet the requirements of the Kansas City Building Code. Checking the calculations at the design stage could have prevented this disaster. Investigations reveal that neither the designers nor the builders assumed responsibility for the final product. The design review process was ineffective. The accident was caused by relying on a longitudinal weld that wasn’t strong enough.
For the engineering profession, the walkway collapse tragedy became a classic model in studying engineering ethics and errors. The American Society of Civil Engineers established the precedent that responsibility for the building lies with the engineer’s seal, referring to whoever sets their seal of approval on a set of plans. A city engineer, moreover, must do a formal check on load-bearing calculations. In this way, potential failures would be caught at the design stage and not after an accident takes place.
Further investigations revealed that the original design that was given by structural engineer Jake D. Gillum required continuous suspension rods approximately 40-feet long. The steel fabricator Havens determined that these would be unacceptably expensive to procure and install. Therefore, he changed the design. The original design sized the suspension rods such that they were strong enough to support only 60% of the imposed load, based on code-allowable stresses. It is obvious that the use of the originally suggested suspension rods may have prevented the tragedy.
Several participants in the design-construction process claimed to have told Gillum over the phone about the concerns they had about the safety of the proposed change, including the construction detailer WRW, the steel fabricator Havens, the architect PBNDML, and a technician. Gillum denies having received any such telephone calls. Havens submitted over 40 steel fabrication drawings to Gillum for review, including the one with the fatal change. Gillum reviewed, stamped, and approved the drawings. He did not look at the proposed change of design and its implications. In this case, the suspension rod walkway deck connection was not a standard connection, as detailed by the structural engineer Gillum on his own working drawings but he approved the design change anyway.
The Missouri registration board called it a case of gross negligence, misconduct, unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering and canceled the Missouri professional engineering registration of all engineers involved in the case. An issue was raised to the effect that the Kansas City building department was said to be overworked and did not adequately check the structural drawings and calculations, or they might have discovered the fatal defect. The one positive outcome of this event was a heightened awareness nationwide of the importance of the building department’s plan checking activity. This generally resulted in better funding and more rigorous checking of plans in building departments throughout the country.
The owners of the Hyatt-Regency Hotel paid over $140 million in damages to victims. The Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers, and Land Surveyors convicted engineers employed by Jack D. Gillum and Associates who had approved the final drawings of gross negligence, misconduct, and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. All of them lost their engineering licenses in Missouri and Texas, as well as their American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) memberships. Jack D. Gillum and Associates, for its part, lost its license to be an engineering firm, but Jack Gillum himself continued to take speaking engagements at engineering conferences so that others might learn from his mistakes.
The hotel was rebuilt, and it still stands today, though it has changed many names in the intervening years. Instead of suspended walkways, the lobby was rebuilt with a single crossing on the second floor supported by large pillars, resulting in structurally sound construction.
What lesson did the authorities learn from this incident? State any two actions that the team could have taken to prevent the failure? (Name and describe the actions in about 250 words)
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