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intry A has only öne submarien whith which it can target one (and only one) of three shipping convoys of country B. Country B has no Navy, but has a single helicopter armed whith anti-submarine missile that can be assigned to one of the convoys. The value of convoy, if the convoy is not defended by the anti-submarine helicopter and the submarine of country A attacks it. Countries A wants to maximize the expected value of damage to Country B and country B wants to minimize it. In particular, if the submarine targets convoy i, the payoffs of countries A and B are v, and -v; respectively in case the helicopter is assigned some other convoy j. If ihe submarine targets the convoy to which the helicopter isassigned, each country gets zero payoff. Formula the situation as a simultaneous may be strategic game and show that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria. Find the mixed strategy Nash Equilibria. You need to Navy

intry A has only öne submarien whith which it can target one (and only one) of three shipping convoys of country B. Country B has no Navy, but has a single helicopter armed whith anti-submarine missile that can be assigned to one of the convoys. The value of convoy, if the convoy is not defended by the anti-submarine helicopter and the submarine of country A attacks it. Countries A wants to maximize the expected value of damage to Country B and country B wants to minimize it. In particular, if the submarine targets convoy i, the payoffs of countries A and B are v, and -v; respectively in case the helicopter is assigned some other convoy j. If ihe submarine targets the convoy to which the helicopter isassigned, each country gets zero payoff. Formula the situation as a simultaneous may be strategic game and show that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria. Find the mixed strategy Nash Equilibria. You need to Navy

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
14th Edition
ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
Publisher:NEWNAN
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Q. 3. Countries A and B are at war. Navy of country A has only one submarien whith which it can target one (and only one) of three shipping convoys of country B. Country B has no Navy, but has a single helicopter armed whith anti-submarine missile that can be assigned to one of the convoys. The value of convoy, if the convoy is not defended by the anti-submarine helicoptcr and the submarine of country A attacks it. Countries A wants to maximize the expected value of damage to Country B and country B wants to minimize it. In particular, if the submarine targets convoy i, the payoffs of countries A and B are v, and -v; respectively in case the helicopter is assigned some other convoy j. Ifthe submarine targets the convoy to which the helicopter isassigned, each country gets zero payoff. Formula the situation as a simultaneous may be strategic game and show that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria. Find the mixed strategy Nash Equilibria. You need to consider two case (depending on Whethr (v,+ v) vg >,v, or not).
Transcribed Image Text:Q. 3. Countries A and B are at war. Navy of country A has only one submarien whith which it can target one (and only one) of three shipping convoys of country B. Country B has no Navy, but has a single helicopter armed whith anti-submarine missile that can be assigned to one of the convoys. The value of convoy, if the convoy is not defended by the anti-submarine helicoptcr and the submarine of country A attacks it. Countries A wants to maximize the expected value of damage to Country B and country B wants to minimize it. In particular, if the submarine targets convoy i, the payoffs of countries A and B are v, and -v; respectively in case the helicopter is assigned some other convoy j. Ifthe submarine targets the convoy to which the helicopter isassigned, each country gets zero payoff. Formula the situation as a simultaneous may be strategic game and show that there are no pure strategy Nash equilibria. Find the mixed strategy Nash Equilibria. You need to consider two case (depending on Whethr (v,+ v) vg >,v, or not).
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