ing. In the first round, player 1 proposes a division x = (1, 2, 3), with x₁ + x2 + x3 = 1. After observing the proposed x, first player 2 chooses whether to accept or reject it, then player 3 does. If both accept the proposal, it is implemented and each player i receives payoff ₁. If either rejects the proposal, then we move to the second round of bargaining, in which player 2 proposes a division y = (y1, 92, 93) with y₁ + y2 + y3 = 1, which player 3 first decides whether to accept or reject, followed by player 1. If both 3 and 1 accept, the proposal is implemented, and each player i receives payoff dyi, where & € (0, 1) is a common discount factor. If either rejects the proposal, we move to the third round, in which player 3 makes

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ing. In the first round, player 1 proposes a division x = (₁, 2, 3), with x₁ + x2 + x3 = 1.
After observing the proposed x, first player 2 chooses whether to accept or reject it, then
player 3 does. If both accept the proposal, it is implemented and each player i receives payoff
xį. If either rejects the proposal, then we move to the second round of bargaining, in which
player 2 proposes a division y = (y₁, 92, Y3) with y₁ + y2 + y3 = 1, which player 3 first decides
whether to accept or reject, followed by player 1. If both 3 and 1 accept, the proposal is
implemented, and each player i receives payoff dy;, where & € (0, 1) is a common discount
factor. If either rejects the proposal, we move to the third round, in which player 3 makes
a proposal z = (2₁, 22, 23) with 21 + 22 + z3 = 1 that player 1 accepts or rejects, followed by
player 2. If both 1 and 2 accept, each player i receives payoff 62%i, whereas if either rejects,
all players receive payoffs of 0.
(a) Find all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this game. (Note that you do not have
to describe the full equilibrium strategies.)
Solution: Proceed by backward induction. By the same logic as in the Ultimatum Game,
the subgame beginning with Player 3's proposal in the third round has a unique SPE given
by z = (0, 0, 1) and the other players accepting all offers. Given this, in the second round,
Player 1 will accept any offer and Player 3 will accept any offer of at least 6. Player 2
will therefore offer y = (0, 18, 6). Given this, in the first round, Player 2 will accept
any offer of at least 8(1-5) and Player 3 will accept any offer of at least 62. Thus there
is a unique SPE outcome, which involves Player 1 offering x = (1-8, 8(1-6), 5²) and
both other players accepting.
Transcribed Image Text:ing. In the first round, player 1 proposes a division x = (₁, 2, 3), with x₁ + x2 + x3 = 1. After observing the proposed x, first player 2 chooses whether to accept or reject it, then player 3 does. If both accept the proposal, it is implemented and each player i receives payoff xį. If either rejects the proposal, then we move to the second round of bargaining, in which player 2 proposes a division y = (y₁, 92, Y3) with y₁ + y2 + y3 = 1, which player 3 first decides whether to accept or reject, followed by player 1. If both 3 and 1 accept, the proposal is implemented, and each player i receives payoff dy;, where & € (0, 1) is a common discount factor. If either rejects the proposal, we move to the third round, in which player 3 makes a proposal z = (2₁, 22, 23) with 21 + 22 + z3 = 1 that player 1 accepts or rejects, followed by player 2. If both 1 and 2 accept, each player i receives payoff 62%i, whereas if either rejects, all players receive payoffs of 0. (a) Find all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this game. (Note that you do not have to describe the full equilibrium strategies.) Solution: Proceed by backward induction. By the same logic as in the Ultimatum Game, the subgame beginning with Player 3's proposal in the third round has a unique SPE given by z = (0, 0, 1) and the other players accepting all offers. Given this, in the second round, Player 1 will accept any offer and Player 3 will accept any offer of at least 6. Player 2 will therefore offer y = (0, 18, 6). Given this, in the first round, Player 2 will accept any offer of at least 8(1-5) and Player 3 will accept any offer of at least 62. Thus there is a unique SPE outcome, which involves Player 1 offering x = (1-8, 8(1-6), 5²) and both other players accepting.
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