In Search of Strategy: Nestlé's New Espresso Maker ¹ In 1986, the Swiss giant Nestlé introduced a new type of espresso machine in the Swiss market. It represented one of the most innovative new products developed by its R&D department. Through the use of coffee capsules, the patented system combined the taste of real espresso coffee with convenience and ease of use. Despite an enthusiastic reception from connoisseur coffee drinkers and very promising market research, in the first few years after its introduction, the CoffeeMaker was far from living up to its expectations. In fact, the dedicated business unit was losing money. Therefore, in March 1988, Nestlé appointed a new, young Managing Director, by the name of Jean-Paul Gaillard. Gaillard was considering what to do to improve the new product's fortunes. He realized that, unless sales of the Coffee Maker picked up considerably soon, Nestle would have no choice but to stop investing in the new product. He wondered whether he should give the current strategy more time to play itself out, or whether to devise a completely new strategy for the product? Coffee Industry Trends Market research showed that in existing coffee sectors, consumers were becoming more adventurous in their buying behavior and tended to favor the premium and super premium end of the market. These new markets were growing at the expense of instant powdered coffee. Other changes taking place in the coffee market included: (1) an increasing popularity of cafes and coffee bars; (2) rising brand consciousness; and (3) the rising price-consciousness of the mass market consumer, who switched to supermarket brands if the price of coffee rose. The Rise of Espresso Espresso coffee is coffee of the greatest possible strength, implying thicker consistency and more caffeine per unit volume than most beverages. Its quality is determined by the "fineness" of the coffee used, which in turn depends on the grind as well as on the type of appliance with which it's being prepared. Espresso machines, in which water and steam are forced through the ground coffee under pressure, need the finest grinds of all in order to produce coffee of the greatest possible strength. Espresso coffee was traditionally popular in Italy, Spain and France but it was also becoming more popular in other European countries and the US.

Essentials Of Investments
11th Edition
ISBN:9781260013924
Author:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Publisher:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Chapter1: Investments: Background And Issues
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  1. Introduction: A brief introduction of the case study and company’s new product.
  2. Identify the key problem/Issue discussed in the case study
  3. Analysis of strategic and financial factors
Café-X
In Search of Strategy: Nestlé's New Espresso Maker
In 1986, the Swiss giant Nestlé introduced a new type of espresso machine in the Swiss market. It
represented one of the most innovative new products developed by its R&D department. Through the use of
coffee capsules, the patented system combined the taste of real espresso coffee with convenience and ease
of use.
Despite an enthusiastic reception from connoisseur coffee drinkers and very promising market research, in
the first few years after its introduction, the CoffeeMaker was far from living up to its expectations. In fact,
the dedicated business unit was losing money. Therefore, in March 1988, Nestlé appointed a new, young
Managing Director, by the name of Jean-Paul Gaillard.
Gaillard was considering what to do to improve the new product's fortunes. He realized that, unless sales of
the CoffeeMaker picked up considerably soon, Nestlé would have no choice but to stop investing in the
new product. He wondered whether he should give the current strategy more time to play itself out, or
| whether to devise a completely new strategy for the product?
Coffee Industry Trends
Market research showed that in existing coffee sectors, consumers were becoming more adventurous in
their buying behavior and tended to favor the premium and super premium end of the market. These new
markets were growing at the expense of instant powdered coffee.
Other changes taking place in the coffee market included: (1) an increasing popularity of cafes and coffee
bars; (2) rising brand consciousness; and (3) the rising price-consciousness of the mass market consumer,
who switched to supermarket brands if the price of coffee rose.
The Rise of Espresso
Espresso coffee is coffee of the greatest possible strength, implying thicker consistency and more caffeine
per unit volume than most beverages. Its quality is determined by the "fineness" of the coffee used, which
in turn depends on
machines, in which water and steam are forced through the ground coffee under pressure, need the finest
grinds of all in order to produce coffee of the greatest possible strength. Espresso coffee was traditionally
popular in Italy, Spain and France but it was also becoming more popular in other European countries and
the US.
the grind as well as on the type of appliance with which it's being prepared. Espresso
Nestlé's Positions in Coffee
Nestlé held a dominant market position in instant coffee. Soluble coffee was the biggest money-maker for
Nestlé and it represented more than 80% of Nestlé's coffee sales, with the rest coming from roast a
ground coffee sales. It had strong brands in all the sub-segments of the instant-coffee market, yet Nestlé felt
it could not rest on its laurels. Its traditional competitors were becoming more aggressive and supermarket
chains were entering the market through their own brands. Nestlé began to segment the soluble coffee
market into finer and finer segments. This gave a further boost to the demand for instant coffee but did not
attract the high-end consumer who required a foamier coffee, achievable only with the use of pressurized
water.
' This case is based on research by Costas Markides, Professor of Strategic & International Management at the London
Business School
History of the EspressoMaker
The origins of the new EspressoMaker date back to the late 1960s. Continuous experimentation over a ten
year period had led to the final system that consisted of two parts: a coffee capsule and a machine. The
coffee capsule contained 5g of roast and ground coffee. The machine was jointly developed with the Swiss
machine manufacturer Turmix. The use of the new system was rather straightforward. The capsule was
manually placed in the handle, which was introduced into the machine. This action pierced the coffee
capsule at the top. At the press of a button, pressurized, steamed water was passed through the capsule and
the result was a creamy, foamy, high-quality cup of espresso coffee.
Strategic Positioning, 1985-87
The success of the EspressoMaker depended not only on the coffee product (i.e. the coffee capsules) which
Nestlé controlled, but also on the quality of the appliances used (outside Nestlé's control) and lastly, on the
ability to produce and sell to a mass market. This dependence on outsiders was unusual for Nestlé. In
addition, the product threatened to cannibalize the sales of other Nestlé products.
Nestlé set up a joint venture with a Swiss-based operator called Sobal to sell the new product. The joint
venture (Sobal-EspressoMaker) purchased the machines from Turmix and the coffee capsules from Nestlé
and then distributed and sold everything as a system-one product, one price. A separate unit called
EspressoMaker S.A. supported the joint venture and provided technical and marketing advice. As shown in
Exhibit 1, twenty-two other distributors were given permission to sell EspressoMaker machines.
Choice of Customers
With the EspressoMaker, Nestlé would no longer be selling merely a product, but also the required
hardware and the related services. This required Nestlé to focus on the production of high quality coffee
capsules, a service offering to satisfy the customer, the manufacturing of reliable machines, the training of
people on how to operate the system, and the organization of a maintenance workforce.
Once the target countries were chosen (initially Switzerland, Italy, France and Japan), Nestlé further
defined target market segments. Nestlé felt that the high cost of the machines and the capsules meant that
household users would not find the EspressoMaker product attractive. By contrast, offices and small
companies were thought to be less price-sensitive and more likely to buy the EspressoMaker system as a
perk for their employees. Small and medium sized companies were therefore identified as the primary
target market-these companies were unlikely to buy a sophisticated, large-scale espresso machine but
would be receptive to the EspressoMaker system as an attractive alternative due to its relatively cheap price
and its ease-of-use and reliability.
Selling and Distribution
The EspressoMaker machines were sold either by Sobal- EspressoMaker or by 22 other distributors. Sobal-
EspressoMaker approached customers through a direct mailing campaign all over Switzerland. If interested,
the customer filled out and returned a simple form at which point the Sobal salespeople approached
himher. The EspressoMaker machine would then be delivered to the customer. The joint-venture had no
sales force, so it depended on Sobal personnel. However, the Sobal sales force consisted of two
representatives and two technicians for whom the sale of EspressoMaker machines was only one of their
numerous responsibilities. As a result, the 22 other distributors of the EspressoMaker machines played an
important role
Sobal was a small company active in the distribution of a wide variety of products (appliances, cosmetics, etc).
Transcribed Image Text:Café-X In Search of Strategy: Nestlé's New Espresso Maker In 1986, the Swiss giant Nestlé introduced a new type of espresso machine in the Swiss market. It represented one of the most innovative new products developed by its R&D department. Through the use of coffee capsules, the patented system combined the taste of real espresso coffee with convenience and ease of use. Despite an enthusiastic reception from connoisseur coffee drinkers and very promising market research, in the first few years after its introduction, the CoffeeMaker was far from living up to its expectations. In fact, the dedicated business unit was losing money. Therefore, in March 1988, Nestlé appointed a new, young Managing Director, by the name of Jean-Paul Gaillard. Gaillard was considering what to do to improve the new product's fortunes. He realized that, unless sales of the CoffeeMaker picked up considerably soon, Nestlé would have no choice but to stop investing in the new product. He wondered whether he should give the current strategy more time to play itself out, or | whether to devise a completely new strategy for the product? Coffee Industry Trends Market research showed that in existing coffee sectors, consumers were becoming more adventurous in their buying behavior and tended to favor the premium and super premium end of the market. These new markets were growing at the expense of instant powdered coffee. Other changes taking place in the coffee market included: (1) an increasing popularity of cafes and coffee bars; (2) rising brand consciousness; and (3) the rising price-consciousness of the mass market consumer, who switched to supermarket brands if the price of coffee rose. The Rise of Espresso Espresso coffee is coffee of the greatest possible strength, implying thicker consistency and more caffeine per unit volume than most beverages. Its quality is determined by the "fineness" of the coffee used, which in turn depends on machines, in which water and steam are forced through the ground coffee under pressure, need the finest grinds of all in order to produce coffee of the greatest possible strength. Espresso coffee was traditionally popular in Italy, Spain and France but it was also becoming more popular in other European countries and the US. the grind as well as on the type of appliance with which it's being prepared. Espresso Nestlé's Positions in Coffee Nestlé held a dominant market position in instant coffee. Soluble coffee was the biggest money-maker for Nestlé and it represented more than 80% of Nestlé's coffee sales, with the rest coming from roast a ground coffee sales. It had strong brands in all the sub-segments of the instant-coffee market, yet Nestlé felt it could not rest on its laurels. Its traditional competitors were becoming more aggressive and supermarket chains were entering the market through their own brands. Nestlé began to segment the soluble coffee market into finer and finer segments. This gave a further boost to the demand for instant coffee but did not attract the high-end consumer who required a foamier coffee, achievable only with the use of pressurized water. ' This case is based on research by Costas Markides, Professor of Strategic & International Management at the London Business School History of the EspressoMaker The origins of the new EspressoMaker date back to the late 1960s. Continuous experimentation over a ten year period had led to the final system that consisted of two parts: a coffee capsule and a machine. The coffee capsule contained 5g of roast and ground coffee. The machine was jointly developed with the Swiss machine manufacturer Turmix. The use of the new system was rather straightforward. The capsule was manually placed in the handle, which was introduced into the machine. This action pierced the coffee capsule at the top. At the press of a button, pressurized, steamed water was passed through the capsule and the result was a creamy, foamy, high-quality cup of espresso coffee. Strategic Positioning, 1985-87 The success of the EspressoMaker depended not only on the coffee product (i.e. the coffee capsules) which Nestlé controlled, but also on the quality of the appliances used (outside Nestlé's control) and lastly, on the ability to produce and sell to a mass market. This dependence on outsiders was unusual for Nestlé. In addition, the product threatened to cannibalize the sales of other Nestlé products. Nestlé set up a joint venture with a Swiss-based operator called Sobal to sell the new product. The joint venture (Sobal-EspressoMaker) purchased the machines from Turmix and the coffee capsules from Nestlé and then distributed and sold everything as a system-one product, one price. A separate unit called EspressoMaker S.A. supported the joint venture and provided technical and marketing advice. As shown in Exhibit 1, twenty-two other distributors were given permission to sell EspressoMaker machines. Choice of Customers With the EspressoMaker, Nestlé would no longer be selling merely a product, but also the required hardware and the related services. This required Nestlé to focus on the production of high quality coffee capsules, a service offering to satisfy the customer, the manufacturing of reliable machines, the training of people on how to operate the system, and the organization of a maintenance workforce. Once the target countries were chosen (initially Switzerland, Italy, France and Japan), Nestlé further defined target market segments. Nestlé felt that the high cost of the machines and the capsules meant that household users would not find the EspressoMaker product attractive. By contrast, offices and small companies were thought to be less price-sensitive and more likely to buy the EspressoMaker system as a perk for their employees. Small and medium sized companies were therefore identified as the primary target market-these companies were unlikely to buy a sophisticated, large-scale espresso machine but would be receptive to the EspressoMaker system as an attractive alternative due to its relatively cheap price and its ease-of-use and reliability. Selling and Distribution The EspressoMaker machines were sold either by Sobal- EspressoMaker or by 22 other distributors. Sobal- EspressoMaker approached customers through a direct mailing campaign all over Switzerland. If interested, the customer filled out and returned a simple form at which point the Sobal salespeople approached himher. The EspressoMaker machine would then be delivered to the customer. The joint-venture had no sales force, so it depended on Sobal personnel. However, the Sobal sales force consisted of two representatives and two technicians for whom the sale of EspressoMaker machines was only one of their numerous responsibilities. As a result, the 22 other distributors of the EspressoMaker machines played an important role Sobal was a small company active in the distribution of a wide variety of products (appliances, cosmetics, etc).
The customer could order coffee capsules either directly from the Sobal- EspressoMaker joint venture or
from the distributors. The joint-venture preferred to sell the machines at a high price but kept the prices of
the coffee capsules low. On the other hand, the distributors favored leasing of the machines and selling the
capsules at a high price. It was in the sale of capsules that the distributors made their money.
Production
It was decided that one of SPN's (Société des Produits Nestlé) small coffee factories located in Switzerland
would be responsible for the production of the coffee capsules.
The production of the machines was a more difficult issue. Natural partners to manufacture the machines
included companies whose existing business included the manufacture and distribution all kinds of
household appliances, including coffee machines. Sub-contracting manufacturing to one of these
companies was risky because they had little incentive to promote the EspressoMaker machines. Most of
these potential partners already had in their product offerrings a machine for roast and ground coffee sold
under their own brand name. However, Nestlé believed that these subcontractors would realize that it was
better for them to cannibalize their own products than for one of their competitors to do it for them-
especially with an innovation as promising as the EspressoMaker system. Therefore, the real issues for
Nestlé related more to the volumes and the margins that it would be willing to accept from these
subcontractors than whether to subcontract to them or not. In the end, Turmix was selected as the main sub-
contractor for the production of the machines to be sold in Europe.
Pricing and Services
Test markets showed that coffee made with a EspressoMaker machine was excellent but that there were
few customers who would buy a machine at SFr. 600 and pay an additional SFr. 0.30 per cup of coffee. It
was therefore decided that potential elients would receive machines on a trial basis. Coffee capsules would
now be sold at SFr. 0.60 a piece. For EspressoMaker, the lending of machines to customers would stimulate
interest in the new system. For the customer, the "try now, buy later" approach was very attractive. Those
interested in owning a machine could purchase the machine with or without services (services included a
five year warranty and on-site assistance). The coffee capsules were manufactured by SPN in Orbe,
Switzerland, and sold to the joint venture. As with the machines, the capsules were either directly sold to
customers of the joint-venture or through dealers.
Results of the first two years: 1986-1987
Table 1 presents the results of the first two years in terms of machine sales. The targets were far from being
reached and the actual results barely amounted to half of the targeted figures.
Table 1:
Number of machines manufactured and sold in 1986/87 (in units)
Machines Model
C 100
C1100
C 1101
Total
3,939
2,487
Manufactured
15,662
9,852
2,800
22,401
12,339
Sold
In terms of coffee capsules, the volume sold in the first two years was also far below the forecast volume.
Despite a major jump in 1987, the volume sold in tons of coffee did not reach the amounts expected by
Nestlé at launch time in 1985. Unless the sales of machines picked up considerably, there was little hope
that coffee capsule sales could improve a lot.
3
The financial numbers (Table 2), reflected the disappointing sales of machines and coffee capsules.
Investments in the launch of the EspressoMaker system in Japan worsened the situation. It should be noted
that R&D costs spent up-front (about Sfr, 1,756,000) are not accounted for in Table 2.
There were other warning signs on the horizon. The machines were not reliable, leading to continuous
maintenance and service. Defective parts led to high costs of repair which often outweighed the cost of a
new machine. On the distribution side, distributors had not reached sales targets, making EspressoMaker's
survival diflicult.
Table 2:
Operating results for EspressoMaker S.A. and worldwide,1986-87
1986
1987
Sales
1,485
-1.512
-1,082
71
3.842
Cost of goods sold
Operating margin
-3.357
-1,979
197
Fees on machines sold
R&D
-500
-2,282
Operating results of EspressoMaker S.A
-1.011
Operating results of EspressoMaker SA
Operating results of Nestlé Japan
Loss on transfer pricing
Operating results of SPN
Gains on taxes
Financial costs
-1,011
-1.782
NA
NA
-1,974
343
NA
-277
NA
NA
1,167
-90
-1,011
-3,799
What to do?
It was clear that the current strategy was not producing the desired results but Jean-Paul Gaillard was
unsure whether the strategy had to be radically changed or whether it was a just a matter of allowing the
current strategy to play itself out. Even if he decided in favor of changing the current strategy, the question
was, "change towards whar?"
Transcribed Image Text:The customer could order coffee capsules either directly from the Sobal- EspressoMaker joint venture or from the distributors. The joint-venture preferred to sell the machines at a high price but kept the prices of the coffee capsules low. On the other hand, the distributors favored leasing of the machines and selling the capsules at a high price. It was in the sale of capsules that the distributors made their money. Production It was decided that one of SPN's (Société des Produits Nestlé) small coffee factories located in Switzerland would be responsible for the production of the coffee capsules. The production of the machines was a more difficult issue. Natural partners to manufacture the machines included companies whose existing business included the manufacture and distribution all kinds of household appliances, including coffee machines. Sub-contracting manufacturing to one of these companies was risky because they had little incentive to promote the EspressoMaker machines. Most of these potential partners already had in their product offerrings a machine for roast and ground coffee sold under their own brand name. However, Nestlé believed that these subcontractors would realize that it was better for them to cannibalize their own products than for one of their competitors to do it for them- especially with an innovation as promising as the EspressoMaker system. Therefore, the real issues for Nestlé related more to the volumes and the margins that it would be willing to accept from these subcontractors than whether to subcontract to them or not. In the end, Turmix was selected as the main sub- contractor for the production of the machines to be sold in Europe. Pricing and Services Test markets showed that coffee made with a EspressoMaker machine was excellent but that there were few customers who would buy a machine at SFr. 600 and pay an additional SFr. 0.30 per cup of coffee. It was therefore decided that potential elients would receive machines on a trial basis. Coffee capsules would now be sold at SFr. 0.60 a piece. For EspressoMaker, the lending of machines to customers would stimulate interest in the new system. For the customer, the "try now, buy later" approach was very attractive. Those interested in owning a machine could purchase the machine with or without services (services included a five year warranty and on-site assistance). The coffee capsules were manufactured by SPN in Orbe, Switzerland, and sold to the joint venture. As with the machines, the capsules were either directly sold to customers of the joint-venture or through dealers. Results of the first two years: 1986-1987 Table 1 presents the results of the first two years in terms of machine sales. The targets were far from being reached and the actual results barely amounted to half of the targeted figures. Table 1: Number of machines manufactured and sold in 1986/87 (in units) Machines Model C 100 C1100 C 1101 Total 3,939 2,487 Manufactured 15,662 9,852 2,800 22,401 12,339 Sold In terms of coffee capsules, the volume sold in the first two years was also far below the forecast volume. Despite a major jump in 1987, the volume sold in tons of coffee did not reach the amounts expected by Nestlé at launch time in 1985. Unless the sales of machines picked up considerably, there was little hope that coffee capsule sales could improve a lot. 3 The financial numbers (Table 2), reflected the disappointing sales of machines and coffee capsules. Investments in the launch of the EspressoMaker system in Japan worsened the situation. It should be noted that R&D costs spent up-front (about Sfr, 1,756,000) are not accounted for in Table 2. There were other warning signs on the horizon. The machines were not reliable, leading to continuous maintenance and service. Defective parts led to high costs of repair which often outweighed the cost of a new machine. On the distribution side, distributors had not reached sales targets, making EspressoMaker's survival diflicult. Table 2: Operating results for EspressoMaker S.A. and worldwide,1986-87 1986 1987 Sales 1,485 -1.512 -1,082 71 3.842 Cost of goods sold Operating margin -3.357 -1,979 197 Fees on machines sold R&D -500 -2,282 Operating results of EspressoMaker S.A -1.011 Operating results of EspressoMaker SA Operating results of Nestlé Japan Loss on transfer pricing Operating results of SPN Gains on taxes Financial costs -1,011 -1.782 NA NA -1,974 343 NA -277 NA NA 1,167 -90 -1,011 -3,799 What to do? It was clear that the current strategy was not producing the desired results but Jean-Paul Gaillard was unsure whether the strategy had to be radically changed or whether it was a just a matter of allowing the current strategy to play itself out. Even if he decided in favor of changing the current strategy, the question was, "change towards whar?"
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