In an infinitely repeated game, 2 identical firms compete every period a la Bertrand. Aggregate demand is given by Q(Pmin) 10-Pmin. Both firms have constant marginal costs c (with c higher than 1 but less than 4) and no fixed costs. Firms are secretly considering a collusive strategy where they start by playing the a pre-specified collusive price på (where pe is between 5 and 8), and keep doing so until a deviation is detected. If there is a detection at any time, then firms start choosing price p = c after they see that deviation, and remain playing p = c forever. Both firms have the same discount factor & > 0. As seen in class, this proposed "Grim Trigger" strategy profile can be a SPNE only if d is above some value. Among the following four statements about the minimum & required for the collusive agreement to be an SPNE, which of them is CORRECT (if any)? = (a) The higher the pre-specified collusive price pc, the higher the minimum 8. (b) The lower the pre-specified collusive price pc, the higher the minimum 6. (c) The higher the marginal cost c, the higher the minimum 6. (d) The lower the marginal cost c, the higher the minimum 8. (e) None of the four statements is correct.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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ISBN:9780190931919
Author:NEWNAN
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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* Please be advised this is for practice preperation only ** i just really need help on this - I dont undertsand 

In an infinitely repeated game, 2 identical firms compete every period a la Bertrand.
Aggregate demand is given by Q(Pmin) 10-Pmin. Both firms have constant marginal
costs c (with c higher than 1 but less than 4) and no fixed costs. Firms are secretly
considering a collusive strategy where they start by playing the a pre-specified collusive
price på (where pe is between 5 and 8), and keep doing so until a deviation is detected.
If there is a detection at any time, then firms start choosing price p = c after they see
that deviation, and remain playing p = c forever. Both firms have the same discount
factor & > 0. As seen in class, this proposed "Grim Trigger" strategy profile can be a
SPNE only if d is above some value.
Among the following four statements about the minimum & required for the collusive
agreement to be an SPNE, which of them is CORRECT (if any)?
=
(a) The higher the pre-specified collusive price pc, the higher the minimum 8.
(b) The lower the pre-specified collusive price pc, the higher the minimum 6.
(c) The higher the marginal cost c, the higher the minimum 6.
(d) The lower the marginal cost c, the higher the minimum 8.
(e) None of the four statements is correct.
Transcribed Image Text:In an infinitely repeated game, 2 identical firms compete every period a la Bertrand. Aggregate demand is given by Q(Pmin) 10-Pmin. Both firms have constant marginal costs c (with c higher than 1 but less than 4) and no fixed costs. Firms are secretly considering a collusive strategy where they start by playing the a pre-specified collusive price på (where pe is between 5 and 8), and keep doing so until a deviation is detected. If there is a detection at any time, then firms start choosing price p = c after they see that deviation, and remain playing p = c forever. Both firms have the same discount factor & > 0. As seen in class, this proposed "Grim Trigger" strategy profile can be a SPNE only if d is above some value. Among the following four statements about the minimum & required for the collusive agreement to be an SPNE, which of them is CORRECT (if any)? = (a) The higher the pre-specified collusive price pc, the higher the minimum 8. (b) The lower the pre-specified collusive price pc, the higher the minimum 6. (c) The higher the marginal cost c, the higher the minimum 6. (d) The lower the marginal cost c, the higher the minimum 8. (e) None of the four statements is correct.
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