How had Chevron tried to mitigate the political risks of the project?
Transcribed Image Text: Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk CHAPTER 17
553
EXHIBIT A The Caspian Sea and Pipelines to Markets
• Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)
Pipeline would be 980 miles in length from the
Caspian Sea to the Russian Black Sea port of
UKRAINE
RUSSIA
KAZAKHSTAN
Novorossiysk.
• Largely linking existing pipeline segments,
it was by far the most expeditious pipe for
Tengiz oil.
• It would be under Russian control.
CPC Pipeline
Tengiz
• Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
Pipeline extended 1,000 miles from Baku,
Azerbaijan, on the Caspian, through Georgia,
and across Turkey, to the Mediterranean
port of Ceyhan.
• Constructed intentionally to bypass Russia,
Black
Caspian
Sea
Sea
GEORGIA
ARMENIA
AZERBAIJAN
it was constructed by a consortium of
companies and countries.
• Requiring five years for construction,
it opened in 2005.
• Unused capacity made it one of the
promising pipes for Kashagan oil.
TURKEY
втС Рipeline
TURKMENISTAN
SYRIA
IRAQ
IRAN
ago, fifteen years ago when contracts were written, people
didn't understand the complexities.
the world's leading expert on oil fires based in Houstón,
capped it. The environmental impacts wère significant.
In the following years as oil and gas developments were
dictated by Moscow, the Kazakhs worried that their most
precious delicacy, caviar, the eggs of the sturgeon found in
the Caspian and Black seas, could be put at risk.’ Any sug-
gestion of oil and gas development near the Caspian, home
of the most famous beluga sturgeon and caviar, faced seri-
ous public opposition. Baku, devastated by oil develop-
ment in the late 19th century and lying just across the
Caspian, served as a reminder of how damaging unregu-
lated oil development could be. Baku was now considered
-Richard Matzke, Chevron Texaco Vice Chairman
of the Board, 2007.
In 2002, after more than $2 billion in development,
already the largest foreign investment in any former
Soviet state, the project needed to enter a second costly
stage: sour gas reinjection. This would require massive new
capital investments to reinject natural gas back into the
reservoir.
Growing Tension
In 2002 Chevron proposed financing the planned
expansion of Tengiz production with the reinvestment of oil
exports as part of its continuing “invest as you go" strategy.
Kazakhstan objected. In addition to slowing the rate of
production growth, the reinvestment would dramatically
reduce the consortium's taxable profits and payments to
the government-and the government needed the money.
In 2003, after Kazakh courts confirmed fines against the
consortium, Chevron agreed to finance new production
capacity with foreign capital, as well as to guarantee
Kazakh tax authorities a minimum of $200 million per
year regardless of consortium profitability. As part of the
agreement, President Nazarbayev passed a new foreign
investment law that guaranteed that existing foreign
one of the world's dirtiest cities.
Sulfur was a continuing problem. Production of oil and
gas produced massive quantities of sulfur, requiring exten-
sive processing. By early 2001, Tengiz had 4.5 million tons
of sulfur spread out in football-field-sized cakes 7.5 meters
thick. Chevron spent more than $40 million on a sulfur pel-
let processing facility in 2001 to expand marketability, but
with mixed success.
I don't think any of us understood the complexities of
what we were about to get ourselves involved in. What
the Kazakh government is worried about is fixing some
of the issues that were relatively unknown when some
of these projects began. The production of oil and gas
in the Caspian is very complex, very difficult. Ten years
During the 1970s the Soviet government had regularly conducted nuclear tests in Kazakhstan.
Transcribed Image Text: 552
PART 5 Foreign Investments and Investment Analysis
The Tengiz Field– Tengiz means “sea" in the Kazak lan-
guage-was discovered in 1979. Although it was thought
to be one of the world's ten largest oil fields, the Tengiz
Field was largely ignored for years as the Soviets focused
their oil development efforts elsewhere. The field saw some
preliminary drilling and production in the mid-1980s, but
needed an investor-operator with technology, experience,
and capital.
The Tengiz reservoir is deep, 14,000 feet down, under
extreme high pressure, and hot, averaging 200°F.The oil is a
sour crude, averaging 12.5% sulfur (high sulfur is anything
above 0.5%). The resulting hydrogen sulfide, H2S, is highly
poisonous to humans and corrosive in pipelines. Tengiz
is in far western Kazakhstan not far from the Caspian, a
remote, barren, and forbidding place where temperatures
range from -25°F to 100°F. With little infrastructure, con-
struction and support were costly. Recruiting, training, and
retention of the highly skilled workforce needed proved to
be a major challenge.
Chevron had carefully avoided making significant up-front
payments. One such clause required that production reach
250,000 barrels of oil per day (bopd) before Chevron had
to make its first $420 million installment on the purchase
price of $800 million. The Kazakhs saw this “invest as you
go" approach as indicative of a low level of commitment,
straining the relationship from the beginning. Chevron also
balked at the traditional Soviet habit of expecting foreign
investors to support non-business-related social infrastruc-
ture such as roads, schools, and hospitals, limiting social
spending to 3% of total investment.
Pipe Dreams
All dressed up and no place to go. That's the dilemma
Chevron Corp. faces in far-off Kazakhstan. The nation's
third-largest oil company is sitting on one of the world's
biggest oil fields in the landlocked former Soviet republic.
Trouble is, after more than two years of work and a
$1 billion investment, Chevron has yet to make much
money on Tengizchevroil, its 50/50 joint venture with the
government of Kazakhstan.
Chevron
Chevron Corporation (U.S.), through a variety of political
channels, succeeded in negotiating a 50% interest in the
field in 1990, one day after a summit between President
Bush of the United States and President Gorbachev of the
-“Chevron Struggling in Tengiz," by Kenneth
Howe, San Francisco Chronicle, September 25, 1995.
Somewhat unique to the Caspian, the right to produce oil
did not mean the owner could sell the oil. Without a pipe-
line for transportation, the oil had no market value. As pro-
duction at Tengiz began in the mid-1990s, it still had no way
to market. Chevron wanted to get the oil west to the Black
Sea; from there, it could then be moved by tanker to the
Mediterranean and markets beyond. Eventually, $2.7 billion
later and with the participation of two other major oil com-
panies, one Russian (Lukoil) and one American (ARCO),
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) was created. The
CPC line would carry Tengiz oil the 1,510 kilometers to the
Black Sea. Operations began in 2003. A second pipeline,
the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), began operation
a few years later, as shown in Exhibit A.
Soviet Union. But the ink was barely dry when the Soviet
Union broke apart. With Kazakhstan's declared indepen-
dence in December 1991, negotiations began again.
Kazakhstan's independence was a tenuous one. Russia
continued to have strong strategic interests in its hydrocar-
bons. The two countries shared a 4,250-mile border and a
common people; Kazakhstan was home to more than six
million ethnic Russians. The war memorial in the center of
Almaty, the old capital of Kazakhstan, celebrated the
Twenty-Eight Panfilov Guardsmen–Kazakhs-who
defended Moscow from the German offensive in Septem-
ber 1941. Chevron eventually reached a “careful agree-
ment" with the Kazakhs in 1993, a 40-year business
agreement to create Tengizchevroil (TCO). The business,
termed a partnership, allocated a 50% interest in the field
to Chevron as well as naming Chevron as the operator.
The company was structured as a joint venture between
Chevron and Kazakhstan.
The Environment
Chevron pledged $20 billion over the next 40 years. In
an attempt to manage what it considered high political risks,
Chevron planned to invest gradually, using reinvestment
of earnings to make up the majority of new investment.
Tengiz also posed major environmental and safety chal-
lenges for TCO. In 1985, before Chevron ever gained
entry to Tengiz, Tengiz well #37 exploded, sending a
200-meter-high column of gas, oil, and fire into the air. The
result was a towering inferno visible for nearly 60 miles,
picked up by U.S. satellites watching Kazakhstan. The fire
burned for more than a year before Red Adair Company,
*Ownership interests have changed over the years. In 2016 Tengiz was 50% owned by Chevron, with ExxonMobil holding 25%;
KazMunaiGaz, the national oil company of Kazakhstan, holding 20%; and LukArco, a joint venture between ARCO (US) and Lukoil
(Russia), holding 5%.