high volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations project is undertaken? What and round your answers to the nearest whole dollar, e.g., 32.) What is the expected value of the firm's equity if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What is it if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations and round your answers to the nearest whole dollar, e.g., 32.) Which project would the firm's stockholders prefer? Suppose bondholders are fully aware that stockholders might choose to maximize equity value rather than total firm value and opt for the high-volatility project. To minimize this agency cost, the firm's bondholders decide to use a bond covenant to ipulate that the bondholders can demand a higher payment if the firm chooses to ke on the high-volatility project. What payment to bondholders would makn ockholders indifferent between the two

Essentials Of Investments
11th Edition
ISBN:9781260013924
Author:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Publisher:Bodie, Zvi, Kane, Alex, MARCUS, Alan J.
Chapter1: Investments: Background And Issues
Section: Chapter Questions
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firm's only activity and that the firm will close one year from today. The firm is obligated
to make a $3,700 payment to bondholders at the end of the year. The projects have the
same systematic risk, but different volatilities. Consider the following information
pertaining to the two projects:
Low-Volatility High-Volatility
Economy Probability Project Payoff Project Payoff
Bad
.50
$3,700
$3,100
Good
.50
4,000
4,600
a. What is the expected value of the firm if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What
if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations
and round your answers to the nearest whole dollar, e.g., 32.)
b. What is the expected value of the firm's equity if the low-volatility project is
undertaken? What is it if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round
intermediate calculations and round your answers to the nearest whole dollar, e.g.,
32.)
c. Which project would the firm's stockholders prefer?
d. Suppose bondholders are fully aware that stockholders might choose to maximize
equity value rather than total firm value and opt for the high-volatility project. To
minimize this agency cost, the firm's bondholders decide to use a bond covenant to
stipulate that the bondholders can demand a higher payment if the firm chooses to
take on the high-volatility project. What payment to bondholders would make
stockholders indifferent between the two projects? (Do not round intermediate
calculations and round your answer to the nearest whole dollar, e.g., 32.)
a. Low-volatility project value
High-volatility project value
b. Low-volatility project value
High-volatility project value
C. Stockholders preference
d. Payment to bondholders
$
$
$
3,850
3,850
150
High-volatity project
Transcribed Image Text:firm's only activity and that the firm will close one year from today. The firm is obligated to make a $3,700 payment to bondholders at the end of the year. The projects have the same systematic risk, but different volatilities. Consider the following information pertaining to the two projects: Low-Volatility High-Volatility Economy Probability Project Payoff Project Payoff Bad .50 $3,700 $3,100 Good .50 4,000 4,600 a. What is the expected value of the firm if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations and round your answers to the nearest whole dollar, e.g., 32.) b. What is the expected value of the firm's equity if the low-volatility project is undertaken? What is it if the high-volatility project is undertaken? (Do not round intermediate calculations and round your answers to the nearest whole dollar, e.g., 32.) c. Which project would the firm's stockholders prefer? d. Suppose bondholders are fully aware that stockholders might choose to maximize equity value rather than total firm value and opt for the high-volatility project. To minimize this agency cost, the firm's bondholders decide to use a bond covenant to stipulate that the bondholders can demand a higher payment if the firm chooses to take on the high-volatility project. What payment to bondholders would make stockholders indifferent between the two projects? (Do not round intermediate calculations and round your answer to the nearest whole dollar, e.g., 32.) a. Low-volatility project value High-volatility project value b. Low-volatility project value High-volatility project value C. Stockholders preference d. Payment to bondholders $ $ $ 3,850 3,850 150 High-volatity project
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