Answered: Here is the Markov Chain (enclosed),…

Here is the Markov Chain (enclosed), then… ▪ Which state are communicating? ▪ Which are the transient states? ▪ The systems are ergodic or non-ergodic?

Advanced Engineering Mathematics

10th Edition

ISBN:9780470458365

Author:Erwin Kreyszig

Publisher:Erwin Kreyszig

Chapter2: Second-order Linear Odes

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1RQ

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Question

Here is the Markov Chain (enclosed), then…

▪ Which state are communicating?
▪ Which are the transient states?
▪ The systems are ergodic or non-ergodic?

b. Explain about reneging, balking, dan jockeying in queueing theory!
c. Please pay attention to the following statements!
▪ Statement 1: In making rational decisions, a player needs anticipation of the
competitor’s response.
▪ Statement 2: Competitor’s behaviour can be expected.
Are the two above statements true or false?

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