For the next three questions, assume in a pure exchange economy, Anna (A) and Bob (B) trade fish (F) and cheese (C). There is one unit of fish and one unit of cheese available. Anna's utility function is UA = F2C. Bob's utility function is UB = FC2. Is this allocation Pareto efficient? {(F^CA),(FB.CB)}={(0.5; 0.5); (0.5; 0.5)} Select one: O a. Yes, this allocation is Pareto efficient. O b. No, this allocation is not Pareto efficient. Clear my choice Is this allocation Pareto efficient? {(FA;CA), (FB;CB)}=((1, 0); (0, 1)} Select one: O a. Yes, this allocation is Pareto efficient. O b. No, this allocation is not Pareto efficient. Clear my choice Is this allocation Pareto efficient? {(FACA), (FB;CB)={(1, 1); (0, 0)} Select one: a. No, this allocation is not Pareto efficient O b. Yes, this allocation is Pareto eefficient. Clear my choice

For the next three questions, assume in a pure exchange economy, Anna (A) and Bob (B) trade fish (F) and cheese (C). There is one unit of fish and one unit of cheese available. Anna's utility function is UA = F2C. Bob's utility function is UB = FC2. Is this allocation Pareto efficient? {(F^CA),(FB.CB)}={(0.5; 0.5); (0.5; 0.5)} Select one: O a. Yes, this allocation is Pareto efficient. O b. No, this allocation is not Pareto efficient. Clear my choice Is this allocation Pareto efficient? {(FA;CA), (FB;CB)}=((1, 0); (0, 1)} Select one: O a. Yes, this allocation is Pareto efficient. O b. No, this allocation is not Pareto efficient. Clear my choice Is this allocation Pareto efficient? {(FACA), (FB;CB)={(1, 1); (0, 0)} Select one: a. No, this allocation is not Pareto efficient O b. Yes, this allocation is Pareto eefficient. Clear my choice

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Give answer with explanation and Give Correct and incorrect answer explanation
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12
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